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Summary
Never before has the role of the German Bundestag with regard to European integration 
been so intensively discussed as during the European financial and debt crisis. However, it is 
easy to overlook the fact that major changes have come about in the participation of the 
German Parliament in European policy. On the one hand, this is as a result of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which emphasizes the role of national parliaments in Article 12 TEU and grants them 
additional rights in some fields. On the other hand, it is also because of German law, not least 
spurred on by the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court, ranging from its rulings on the 
European Arrest Warrant in 2005 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 to its rulings on the so-
called rescue packages in 2011 and 2012. Upon closer examination of the most recent devel-
opments, it thus becomes apparent that the Bundestag’s political actions can now no longer 
be seen as “empty” as is alleged in most of the more dated specialist literature. The changes 
in the law over the past few years have enabled the Bundestag to play both a monitoring and 
participatory role in German European policy. 
On the basis of the insights in this study, we wish to put forward three propositions and 
seven recommended courses of action for discussion. 
Propositions:
1. The Bundestag is currently changing its role from that of an observing to a participating 
agent.
2. In order to understand its European policy, it is necessary to take a closer look at various 
subgroups of the Bundestag.
3. The discussion about the role of the Bundestag’s European policy should be conducted 
in the context of the wider debate on the value of parliaments in multi-tiered European 
politics.
 
Recommended courses of action:
1. The Bundestag should concentrate more on essential dossiers, central to the legitimiza-
tion of German and European policy, instead of trying to cover “everything”.
2. The position of the EU Committee in relation to the specialist committees should be re-
considered with a view to its being effectively strengthened – as already provided for in 
the Constitution (Article 45 German Constitution).
3. With regard to the ESM, it would make sense to create a mixed Stability Committee.
4. European legislation should, wherever possible, enjoy the same treatment and status as 
national legislation. 
5. The dependence of the Bundestag’s European policy on a small number of experts from 
the different political groupings should be reduced.
6. Article 23 of the German Constitution should be adapted to meet the requirements aris-
ing from the drive towards Europeanization brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon.
7. In the interests of greater clarity and the coherent manageability of the rights of par-
ticipation of the German Bundestag and Federal Council, the hitherto enacted accom-
panying legislation should be converted into a uniform German Code on European Law.
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2Preface
It is a commonly held view that national parliaments are finding themselves in a 
difficult position at a time of globalization and Europeanization. Parliaments such 
as the German Bundestag, which plays a central and significant role in balancing 
the institutional powers of its states, are also suffering from a net loss of power and 
influence, given that more and more far-reaching decisions are being taken either 
outside their sphere of political influence (economy, finance) or above the national 
level (EU). 
In the course of the past few years, this belief was first perceived to be true by 
experts and then by the general public.  The severe view taken by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court and the impelling tone of its rulings on European policy since its 
verdict on the European Arrest Warrant of 2005 may well have contributed to the 
fact the German Parliament has recently been portrayed in the media as being out 
of its depth and even weak and powerless. 
Researchers, known for their more reserved phraseology, have expressed it much 
more cautiously. The rights of the national parliaments, in particular those of the 
Bundestag, have constantly been extended in the course of European integration. 
For this reason the Bundestag must be credited with having achieved successes 
in the formal business of law-making. That said, the members of parliament and 
political groups have, in reality, not managed to make widescale and aggressive 
use of their competences. 
If, in the past, the Bundestag’s political ambitions for Europe really did not develop 
to the necessary extent, this begs the question: Are things now different - after 
three years of debt crisis, heated debate, spectacular legislation and intensive leg-
islative reform? If the answer is yes, what has changed? In what ways does the 
Bundestag exercise its power in European politics? Who determines its course?
On behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation’s programme “The Future of Europe”, 
Christian Calliess, Professor of Constitutional and European Law at the Freie 
Universität Berlin, and Timm Beichelt, Professor of European Studies at the 
European University Viadrina, have set about finding this out.  In this study they 
analyze the status of national parliaments within the European Union, as exempli-
fied by the German Bundestag, using the means afforded by legal and political 
science to examine the parliament both inter- and intra-institutionally, i.e. its rela-
tionship with both government bodies and its own internal organization. 
Without wishing to anticipate its results, we can give away this much: The Bundestag 
has become a parliament with the will to influence and shape governance – and 
this includes European politics. It is not only a question of monitoring. It is also a 
question of participation.
Isabell Hoffmann  
Bertelsmann Foundation
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On the path to a Europeanized Bundestag: 
From observer to player?
I. Introduction
Never before has the role of the German Bundestag with regard to European inte-
gration been so intensively discussed as during the European financial and debt 
crisis. However, it is easy to overlook the fact that major changes have come about 
in the participation of the German Parliament in European policy. These were moti-
vated, on the one hand at the level of European law, by the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
emphasizes the role of national parliaments in Article 12 TEU and grants them 
additional rights in some fields. e.g. subsidiarity monitoring. On the other hand, it 
is also because of the rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court, ranging 
from its rulings on the European Arrest Warrant on 18 July 2005 and the Treaty of 
Lisbon on 30 June 2009 to its rulings in the context of the so-called rescue pack-
ages in 2011 and 2012, citing responsibility for integration and for the budget as 
the impetus for the domestic strengthening of the Bundestag’s participation rights. 
It would, however, be wrong to solely attribute the dynamism of the parliament’s 
European policies to these more recent developments. The position of the Bunde-
stag in the EU’s multi-layered system has been a subject of discussion for more 
than 20 years, reaching its first culminating moment in 1993 with the Maastricht 
Ruling. Thus a considerable number of legislative and organizational reforms can 
be looked back upon. 
In the field of foreign affairs, however, the German Basic Law (the Constitution), in 
an entirely classical way, first of all attributes the leading role to the government. 
It is also best equipped for this complex task with its ministries, in particular the 
Foreign Office. In Germany’s parliamentary governmental system the legislature 
mostly “only” makes use of retrospective monitoring rights. Its scope of action in 
the field of foreign affairs is consequently limited. According to Article 59, para 
2, s. 1 of the Basic Law, for example, treaties which regulate the political relations 
of the Federal Government or refer to objects of federal legislature require the 
(retrospective) approval of the legislature. According to the Federal Constitutional 
Court1, just because in Article 59, para 2 of the Basic Law, provision is made for the 
form of a law in special cases, this does not give the Bundestag the (general) right 
to intervene in the (original) competences of the executive.  
All the important international treaties fall under Article 59, para 2 of the Basic 
Law, and thus also the European treaties, ranging from the ECSC and the EEC Trea-
ties to the EU Treaty. Since the change to the Constitution in 1992, Article 23 para 
1 is applied in parallel in the case of all treaties pertaining to the development of 
the EU. Consequently, every qualitative step towards European integration linked 
to the transferring of rights of sovereignty has taken place with the approval of the 
citizens represented in the Bundestag (as well as that of the Federal Council repre-
senting the federal states). Since the inclusion of the European Article, according 
to Article 23 para 1, s. 2 and 3 in conjunction with Article 79, para 2 of the Basic 
Law, in most cases a two-thirds majority is even required in parliament. Every 
step towards integration is therefore democratically legitimated and arrived at by 
definition “through democracy”.
1 BVerfGE 1, 372 (394)
4Moreover, every change to the Treaty can be understood as a further democratic 
confirmation of the process of European integration. 
What is, therefore, the much discussed “democratic deficit” in the process of Euro-
pean integration?  Why, for example, did the “Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe” of 2003, which was rejected in the French and Dutch referendums 
and pruned to become no more than a reform project in the form of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, come in for so much criticism? Should the decisive step towards integration 
- not from a legal point of view but from a political one – perhaps not be seen as a 
contractual transfer of competence but as the actual exercise of competence, as a 
result of which the competence which has been transferred is expressed through 
European law?
In point of fact, it should not be forgotten that the more responsibilities are trans-
ferred to the EU by member states, the more the question of democracy takes a 
prominent place in the political and legal debate, and this for good reason. Despite 
the fact that it is rarely a question of the sole responsibilities of the EU but usu-
ally of shared responsibilities exercised jointly with member countries, the use 
of these powers by the EU nevertheless leads to the national parliaments’ losing 
their scope for action and influence due to the blocking effect of EU law (cf. Article 
2, para 1 and 2 TFEU). Thus the principle of subsidiarity takes on an important 
function since it helps to point the way towards the level at which action should be 
taken in each case. It is therefore vital that it should be consistently observed in 
the everyday decision-making processes of the EU.
When the role of the Bundestag in European politics is hotly debated against this 
backdrop, there is also good reason for the focus also to be on the question of 
democracy. This is, without doubt, not least because of Germany’s post-war his-
tory. When work was being done on the German Constitution (the Basic Law) and 
also in the political rhetoric of the first decades after the war, the parliamentary 
republic was, as it were, developed as an alternative to the Weimar Republic. In 
the federal system, the government and, in particular, the office of chancellor were 
particularly strongly embedded in the Bundestag and its majorities. On the one 
hand, we are therefore talking about a system constituted less by a separation of 
powers and far more by an interleaving of the powers of the majority in the Bunde-
stag and the government. Thus Parliament is quite naturally viewed as part of the 
political leadership. On the other hand, as a result of the central role of Parliament, 
the individual MP takes on the role of a particularly dependent being in great need 
of legitimization. If his or her capacity to act is curtailed, the entire democratic 
process can quickly come under scrutiny. For this reason it is hardly surprising 
that the Bundestag’s European credentials are frequently questioned as to whether 
they impede MPs in freely exercising their parliamentary mandate in accordance 
with Article 38 of the Basic Law.
The separation of tasks sketched out here is being increasingly challenged by the 
role of the Bundestag in European politics – in the words of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court: by its responsibility for integration. In consequence, the clas-
sical role of Parliament in foreign policy and the division of powers in the field of 
foreign affairs must be rethought. This is because in the field of European policy, 
as evidenced by the interlinked competences in the federal structure of the EU and 
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its member states, it is no longer a question of foreign policy and far more one of 
Europeanized domestic policy. 
Against this backdrop, our study first wishes to describe and evaluate the develop-
ment of the legal framework for the Bundestag’s European policy. In the association 
of European states and constitutions this framework is defined in European and 
constitutional guidelines. The determining factors are, on the one hand, Articles 
9 – 12 TEU, which state the principles of European democracy in concrete terms 
and, on the other hand, the ”Europe Article” of the Basic Law, Article 23, which is 
complemented by various laws on co-operation and accompanying laws as well as 
the previously mentioned rulings by the German Federal Constitutional Court. Fol-
lowing this we are interested in the institutional realities in which European policy 
takes place in the Bundestag. On the other hand, we ask ourselves how the various 
players are coping with the new circumstances. In this connection more than 20 
interviews have been conducted with players and cognoscenti of the Bundestag’s 
European policy. The interviews have been anonymised and incorporated in this 
study. The bottom line of this part of our study is that the many legal changes of 
the past few years have brought about a constellation in which the Bundestag 
is largely able to meet its obligations as regards monitoring and participating in 
domestic European policy. 
It is noticeable in this context that in the debate about European politics in Ger-
many two attitudes dominate. On the one hand, European politics is seen as the 
domain of foreign affairs.  This view of things acknowledges that thanks to Article 
23 of the Basic Law and other acts, the Bundestag has considerable rights of par-
ticipation at its disposal. However, the Federal Government is still seen as the most 
important – and also most accessible – representative of German European policy 
and as a consequence it is seen as a primary European legislator through its activi-
ties in the Council of the EU. This way of understanding European politics is, as it 
were, the traditional pattern. On the other hand however, the considerable increase 
in the rights of information and participation, which the Bundestag has received 
over the last few years, has led to a rival way of thinking which sees European poli-
tics as Europeanized domestic policy and consequently as an essentially “normal 
case” of parliamentary legislation. This becomes particularly noticeable in the case 
of legislation through EU guidelines, which, ideally, the Bundestag was involved 
in drafting through the government’s representative in the Council of the EU (cf. 
Article 23, para 3 of the Basic Law) and thereafter participates in implementing 
domestically (cf. Article 288, para 3 TFEU). In this paradigm the Bundestag is seen 
as the primary legitimating body in the setting of norms which is still responsible 
to the sovereign (the people) when German laws are based on EU directives. From 
this point of view, there is hardly ever any reason to give the Federal Government 
full responsibility for comprehensively pre-formulating acts of law, for in the final 
analysis, this would mean an infringement of the principle of the division of pow-
ers, on the basis of which the shaping of political policy is initiated and organised.
Even upon superficial examination, it can be seen that both patterns stand side by 
side in the debate about the role of the Bundestag. They do not constitute mutu-
ally exclusive options but are, rather, to be seen as the reflections of two traditions 
which were developed in their own spheres – government, parliament – without 
6any apparent contradictions over many decades. The problem today, however, is that 
these practices rooted in tradition are now at odds with each other. In this study we 
show how this tension can be dealt with both institutionally and strategically. 
II. The legal framework for Europeanizing the Bundestag
1. Market, Democracy and the Role of the EU
The modern state, which in the interests of the public good is able to stipulate 
minimum conditions for socially and environmentally acceptable production to the 
companies competing in the market, emerged from an industrial society founded 
on free competition. In the nation state this historical symbiosis of competitive 
market economy and state control was basically able to function, despite its con-
flicts and deficits, as long as it was possible to impose the demands made on 
companies equally on all competitors and thus support competition. However, the 
ability of national supporting measures to solve the problems and deficits of a mar-
ket economy were and are limited, to the extent that economic relationships are 
becoming internationalized and interwoven as a result of globalization.
Thus, the consequent blurring of state borders has led to tensions between the 
market and democracy. On the one hand, the executive holds the prerogative in 
the classical sense in the field of national foreign policy. Decisions are taken first 
and foremost by governments in a democratic process with only little feedback. On 
the other hand, there is usually a lack of transnational democratic mechanisms in 
a market with blurred borders. Thus, at a global level, the classical international 
organizations in particular, such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organi-
zation, do not have their own internal democratic mechanisms. 
This development is reflected at a regional level in the EU’s internal market. The 
central difference here, of course, is that the European Parliament has arisen as 
a parallel legislative body elected directly by the citizens of the EU (cf. Article 9 
and 10 TEU in conjunction with Articles 20 and 22 TFEU). The internal European 
market, which was the goal of the EEC when it was founded in 1957, aims at a 
fusion of national markets and the comprehensive removal of all impediments to 
transnational movements of goods, services, capital and people (cf. Article 26, para 
2 TFEU). The resulting transnational “rights of the market citizen” to these basic 
freedoms enlarge the freedom of those taking part in the market beyond the bor-
ders of the individual democracies. The opening of the borders has thus created 
an increase in personal freedom favouring mobile individuals and companies and 
which cannot be impinged on by democratic counter-measures. This is because the 
“blurring of boundaries” brought about by European law limits the states’ ability to 
introduce supporting measures to regulate the market, e.g. in the field of environ-
ment and consumer protection. In consequence, laws enacted by national parlia-
ments are “automatically” suspected of potentially distorting competition. 
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It thus becomes apparent that economic integration of the internal market requires 
central regulation and harmonization in the surrounding political areas. In other 
words: if the internal market is not to fail because of differing national standards 
in the fields of the environmental, health or consumer protection, accompanying 
European measures are required in the EU on the part of European legislators, 
right up to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament (cf. 
Article 10, para 2 TEU).
In the final analysis, the lack of democracy in the EU can be traced back to the 
symbiosis of the national state and democracy, which grew historically and is still a 
defining characteristic of most theories of democracy today. This deficit in the the-
ory can be seen not least in the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
on the Treaty of Lisbon. Despite declarations to the contrary2, in the final analysis 
the Court nevertheless took the view, using the German principle of democracy as 
a yardstick, that the EU’s legislative procedure contained a democratic deficit as 
regards the principle of equality in elections.3 However, the Court refrained from 
involving itself more closely with the principles of European democracy. The Trea-
ty of Lisbon formulates some important cornerstones of the specifically European 
concept of democracy in Articles 9 – 12 TEU.
They do not include the significance of the EU, highly appreciated in many plac-
es, as an alternative to the uninhibited economization and de-democratisation of 
spheres of life caused by globalization throughout the world. Thus, thanks to the 
responsibilities granted to the EU by a consensus of national parliaments, it is at 
least possible in Europe to contain the borderless markets by using European leg-
islation on social and environmental issues to prevent a “market without the state”. 
This is because, in the final analysis, anyone who is against a “market without 
the state” must come down on the side of commonly accepted rules and there-
fore Europeanization. European legislation must, however, be sufficiently demo-
cratically legitimized and avoid unnecessary centralization. It is thus a question of 
democracy and subsidiarity.  
2 BVerfGE 123, 267 (368 f.).
3 BVerfGE 123, 267 (370 ff.).
82. Democracy in Association
The principles of European democracy (cf. Article 2 TEU) have been expressed in 
concrete terms since the Treaty of Lisbon in Article 9 ff. TEU. Similarly to the con-
stitutional systems of the member countries, Article 10 TEU places the principle 
of representative democracy at the centre of the principles of European democ-
racy. Paragraph 2 concretizes representative democracy as being a concept of dual 
legitimization. 
Dual legitimacy is the foundation for democracy in the EU (corresponding to the 
dual status of EU citizens, cf. Article 9 s. 2 TEU and Article 20 para 1 TEU): On 
the one hand, citizens in the EU are a source of legitimacy through their represen-
tation as EU citizens in the European Parliament. On the other hand, they are a 
source of legitimacy as national citizens represented by their national parliaments 
in the Council of the European Union.
In accordance with the concept of dual legitimacy, the institutional strengthening 
of the principles of democracy within the framework of the Treaty of Lisbon as per 
Article 10 para 2 TEU starts with the two pillars of democratic legitimacy. Immedi-
ate democratic legitimacy has been strengthened by the fact that the European 
Parliament has equal powers of decision alongside the Council in the legislative 
procedures for most Europeanized areas of policy. Beyond the national parliaments’ 
participation in the decision-making processes of the legislative and monitoring 
procedures of the Union in the Council (in Germany the Bundestag and the Federal 
Council, Articles 23 para 2 – 6 Basic Law), by making objections and complaints 
about subsidiarity, indirect democratic legitimacy - conveyed via the national par-
liaments - is now enjoying a considerable increase in status, including at European 
level (cf. Article 12 TEU). Thus, this specifically European concept of democracy, 
which has been recognized by the German Federal Constitutional Court but not 
taken up by it, has made mutual legitimization at a compensatory level of legiti-
macy possible. The question always remains, however, how the decisions of the 
various representative bodies, national parliaments and the European Parliament 
can be harmonized in view of the interlinked responsibilities in the association of 
European states and constitutions. 
In view of the fact that at best only the beginnings of an autonomous European 
public can be discerned, the national publics have an important role to play from 
the point of view of legitimacy. They are making a significant contribution to the 
creation of a European public. European democracy therefore requires not only 
institutional precautions, which include a strengthening of national parliaments, 
but also material precautions which can operate as effective limitations of power. 
These latter above all include rules for the exercise of power, first and foremost 
the principle of subsidiarity which only permits action at a European level if the 
member states are unable to cope on their own. In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon 
formulates an interesting combination of institutional and material precautions.  
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3. The legal Status of National Parliaments in the EU
In this context, the new role which has been attributed to the national parliaments 
at European level is of great significance. According to Article 12 TEU, the national 
parliaments contribute “actively to the good functioning of the Union”. They are 
thus European players with particular responsibility in this role as “protectors 
of subsidiarity”. Consequently, the focus is on Article 12 lit. b) TEU, according 
to which the national parliaments make sure “that the principle of subsidiarity 
is respected in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”. In addition 
to this, alongside the EU institutions, the parliaments receive their own oppor-
tunity to monitor European legislation by being granted the possibility to raise 
a subsidiarity complaint4 ex ante using the early warning system and the right 
to take action against infringements of the principle of subsididiarity5 ex post at 
the European Court of Justice. By ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is 
upheld, the national parliaments also protect their legislative responsibilities and 
thereby democracy to some extent at a national level. This way of linking the issue 
of competence with that of democracy (Article 12 TEU, Title II TEU is not entitled 
“Provisions on democratic principles” for no reason) corresponds to dual legitimacy.
4. The Bundestag’s Responsibility for Integration
This point – which, of course, is open to interpretation – is the defining link to the 
German parliament’s responsibility for integration, as called for by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its ruling on the Lisbon Treaty. However, the Court does 
not link this responsibility sufficiently to the relevant section in the Basic Law, 
Article 23. As a consequence, the Court interprets the responsibility for integration 
in a more defensive way, almost fending it off. The constitutional requirement to 
establish a united Europe6  in Article 23, para 1, s. 1 and the Preamble of the Basic 
Law is not developed enough in this context. Thus, firstly, the European dimension 
of the responsibility for integration already mentioned (cf. Article 12 TEU) is not 
sufficiently taken into account. Secondly, Article 23, para 1, s. 1 of the Basic Law 
makes it clear in the context of the responsibility for integration, that this must 
also have a constructive, participatory dimension. 
The point of departure for parliamentary responsibility for integration must be 
Article 23 of the Basic Law, which in paragraphs 2 – 6 establishes a differentiated 
system of participatory rights for the Bundestag and Federal Council, which is 
further concretized in laws of implementation on the basis of Article 23, para 3, 
s. 3 for the Bundestag and Article 23, para 7 for the Federal Council. If the Euro-
pean Parliament is only able to make a small contribution towards legitimization, 
according to the principles of democracy which are binding on the European asso-
ciation of states and constitutions (cf. Articles 2 and 10, para 2 TEU and Article 23, 
para 1, s. 1 of the Basic Law) both on the basis of constitutional responsibility for 
4 Article 6 Subsidiarity Protocol.
5 Article 8 Subsidiarity Protocol.
6 BVerfGE 123, 267 (346 f.).
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integration and dual legitimacy as defined in European law for reasons of compen-
sation, the Bundestag is required to provide strengthened legitimacy. Thus Article 
23 in conjunction with the co-operation laws containing concrete detail shows the 
way. The model thereby offered should be expanded upon in view of the new chal-
lenges regarding the responsibility for integration. However, at the same time by 
constitutional and general consensus, it should be made into the point of departure 
for the democratic legitimization of the government in European decision-making 
at national level. In this way, it can be guaranteed that the responsibility for inte-
gration is defined as part of the European principle of democracy constituted by 
the concept of dual legitimacy and therefore interpreted as a responsibility not to 
prevent but to shape it. 
The implementation of democratic principles in the association of EU states and 
constitutions goes hand in hand with the active monitoring and participation of 
national parliaments in European legislative procedures.  It is therefore noticeable 
that the participation of the federal states in the Federal Government’s decision-
making process in matters pertaining to the EU, as provided for in Article 23, para 
4 and 5 of the Basic Law via the Federal Council – at least from a legal point of 
view – continues to be greater than that of the Bundestag. Whereas according to 
Article 23, para 3 of the Basic Law this latter’s official opinion is only to be taken 
into consideration, the Federal Council enjoys staggered rights of participation, 
depending on the given degree of relevance for the federal states. In consequence, 
the view of the Federal Council is to be “duly taken into account” if the focus is 
on the legislative powers of the federal states. The predominant view is that if no 
agreement can be reached with the government, the Federal Council has the right 
to take the final decision. 
It is therefore safe to assume that one of the motives of the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court in its ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon was to strengthen the role of the 
Bundestag as regards its responsibility for integration. The ruling (cf. Agreement 
between the German Bundestag and the Federal Government on Co-operation on 
Affairs of the European Union, the so-called BVV)7, which had previously been 
agreed on by the Bundestag and the Federal Government, was enshrined in the 
EUZBBG8 (Act on the Co-operation of the Federal Government and the German 
Bundestag in EU Affairs) on the initiative of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court.  According to § 9 of the EUZBBG the Federal Government has to base its 
negotiations in the Council of the EU on the view adopted by the Bundestag. Based 
on the BVV, § 9 para 4, s. 1 of the EUZBBG now contains a clause whereby, if the 
official opinion of the Bundestag cannot be adopted in the Council of the EU, a 
parliamentary reservation is lodged in the Council of the EU.  As a consequence, 
the Federal Government is obliged to reach agreement with the Bundestag before 
a final decision is taken by the Council of the EU. 
That said, this norm does not state how to proceed if agreement, which accord-
ing to §9, para 4, s. 4 of the EUZBBG the Federal Government should “endeavour 
to achieve”, cannot be reached. Thus there is a gap to be filled by interpretation. 
7 Agreement between the German Bundestag and the Federal Government on Co-operation on Affairs of the 
European Union.
8 BVerGE 123, 267 (433 f.).
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It is conceivable that in such a case, the position taken by the Bundestag should 
be adopted as a matter of principle. Sentence 6 of the ruling could be used to jus-
tify such an implicit binding effect, whereby the right of the Federal Government 
to take important decisions on foreign affairs and matters of integration should 
remain unaffected. Along these lines, it could be argued that such a government 
right would be superfluous if, in the final analysis, in the event of a lack of agree-
ment, the government’s view were to prevail one way or another. The wording of 
the higher-ranking Article 23, para 3 of the Basic Law, which only formulates the 
obligation to take the view of the Federal Government into consideration, does not 
allow for the binding effect of an official opinion. 
Therefore, if § 9 para 4 EUZBBG, in fulfilment of the responsibility for integration 
called for by the Federal Constitutional Court, seeks to achieve a constructive and 
critical dialogue between the Federal Government and the Bundestag, a procedural 
solution contenting itself with the need for attempts to be made to find agreement 
would seem to be more appropriate.  If agreement cannot be reached – unlike in 
the Danish and Austrian parliaments - the Bundestag’s official opinion is not bind-
ing on the government. In contrast to the Federal Council, in the final analysis 
the Bundestag still does not have the right to take the final decision as regards 
European legislative procedure.
By contrast, on the basis of Article 23, para 1, s. 2 and 3 of the Basic Law, the Bun-
destag (and also the Federal Council) has a genuine right of approval as regards 
dynamic Treaty provisions at European level. In concrete terms, it is about bridg-
ing clauses (cf. Article 48, para 6 TEU and related rulings in TFEU) which make 
implicit changes to the Treaty possible. Under the heading of the responsibility for 
integration, the constitutional court’s requirements in this respect as regards the 
participation of the Bundestag were central to the ruling on the Lisbon Treaty (cf. 
Part C, II. 3.). If the institutions of the Union wish to make use of these bridging 
clauses, not only the representative of the Federal Government but also the Bun-
destag must always take action and agree. On occasion, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has gone too far as regards the responsibility for integration in its ruling on 
the Treaty of Lisbon – and thereby inevitably the law-makers in IntVG (the Law on 
the responsibility for integration) – e.g. in § 8 IntVG as regards the supplementary 
clause on competence of Article 352 TFEU or in the case of the sometimes exces-
sively high demands made concerning the form and procedure regarding concrete 
agreement (cf. §§ 4-6 IntVG). The corresponding danger of a lack of flexibility is, of 
course, lessened by the fact that the IntVG’s concentration on particular situations 
concerning dynamic changes to the Treaty make it reasonable to assume that as a 
kind of “Sunday law” (apart from the regulations regarding the flexibility clause 
and objections and complaints about subsidiarity) it will not be playing a major 
role in everyday European life.
That said, it is regrettable that it does not state that a subsidiarity complaint should 
be constitutionally anchored in Article 23 para 1a of the Basic Law. Such a pro-
vision in the Constitution regarding the competence of the Bundestag to submit 
official opinions, though not absolutely necessary, would have been sensible for 
reasons of systematic clarification, all the more so because a constructive sub-
sidiarity complaint based on ex-ante scrutiny and an action against infringe-
ments of the subsidiarity principle based on ex-post scrutiny are closely linked. 
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The one-sided provision on actions against infringements of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple in the Constitution arguably shifts the focus too much in the direction of 
ex-post scrutiny, without giving due consideration to the political potential of a 
subsidiarity complaint. 
All in all, the new laws are unfortunately too complex and lack transparency. In 
particular, the IntVG is extremely hard to read as a result of its many references 
to regulations in EU treaties, the content of which is not defined in detail, thus 
confirming widely held reservations regarding the alleged lack of transparency of 
European decisions. The parallel existence of a multitude of laws regarding rulings 
on participatory rights in affairs of the Union (GG, EUZBBG, EUZBLG, IntVG, Rules 
of Procedure for the Bundestag and the Federal Council as well as the ongoing BBV 
and BLV) can only be a provisional solution on the way to a uniform “German Code 
on European Law”. 
If today a large part of national legislation has been over-defined as a result 
of European requirements, the strengthening of the Bundestag brought about 
by its broad and constructively interpreted responsibility for integration is long 
overdue with regard to the implementation of the principles of democracy in the 
European association of states and constitutions. A pre-requisite for the effec-
tive linkage of the levels of legitimization is, however, that the Bundestag and 
the Federal Council make active use of their new participatory rights and are 
prepared to take more responsibility in European politics. This, in turn, can only 
succeed if they internalize the multi-tiered legislative procedures in the associa-
tion of states and constitutions and the role they play in them and organise them-
selves accordingly.  In this respect, the Bundestag (spurred on by the Federal 
Constitutional Court) has already taken a variety of measures. Nonetheless, as 
will be shown, there is still room for improvement as regards the Europeaniza-
tion of the Bundestag.
5. The Bundestag’s Responsibility for the Budget
In the context of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the rights of the Bunde-
stag were once again strengthened by the Federal Constitutional Court. One of the 
reasons for this was the political decision taken with the Treaty of Maastricht not 
to accompany a communitarised monetary policy by full competence as regards 
European economic and fiscal policy. Consequently, member countries can only 
coordinate their economic policy within the framework of the Council of the EU 
(Article 121 TFEU). This coordination competence is accompanied by comparative-
ly weak participation on the part of the European Parliament, which – as in other 
fields – does not take part in decision-making but is only informed. In addition to 
this Treaty-based coordination, as a result of the financial and debt crises – with 
the rescue packages, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Pact - a purely intergovernmental 
form of coordination also developed, which, in the absence of any form of official 
European competences, exists entirely outside the Treaties. Although the political 
decisions about the establishment of rescue packages were taken in the institu-
tions of the European Union, both the EFSF and the ESM, which is to take over from 
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it permanently in June 2013, nevertheless operate on the basis of intergovernmen-
tal agreements which in formal terms are not covered by the European Treaties. 
Within the coordinating framework, the European Council has risen to become the 
decisive institution, with the result that negotiating processes conducted by the 
heads of state and the heads of government of the member countries dominate 
decision-making procedures. When far-reaching and binding decisions are taken 
in this framework, democratic legitimization is problematic. This is because when 
the member states coordinate their policies in the European Council, the path to 
legitimacy through the European Parliament is missing because this institution 
is not involved in the decision-making process. As defined in Article 10 para 2 
TEU regarding the compensatory interlinking of legitimization, the national parlia-
ments must compensate for this and ensure a sufficient level of legitimacy. How-
ever, as regards the European Council, especially when it acts intergovernmentally, 
the national parliaments are usually reduced to retrospectively implementing its 
decisions. On the one hand, this is because the preventative participatory rights of 
Article 23  of the Basic Law are not (directly) applied and on the other, the parlia-
mentary majority making up the government will not wish to show up “their prime 
minister” as regards what was achieved in negotiations in the European Coun-
cil. Thus, not only the basic principles of democracy but also the dual legitimacy 
defined in Article 10 para 2 TEU require the national parliaments, the Bundestag 
and the Federal Council in Germany, to make the decisive contribution towards 
legitimization. 
This approach has been confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in the con-
text of its EFSF ruling of 7 September 20119 and the constitutional debate on the 
ratification of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Pact in the summer of 2012.
In the EFSF ruling the Bundestag’s responsibility for the budget was added to its 
responsibility for integration stated in the Lisbon ruling. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court states in its EFSF ruling that the constitutionally applicable criteria 
of Article 20 para 1, para 2 in conjunction with Article 79 para 3 of the Basic Law 
constitute the principle of lasting budgetary autonomy as a result of which the Ger-
man Bundestag can only fulfil its responsibility for the budget through sufficiently 
precise budgetary powers subject to its continued influence. With regard to the 
measures of the EFSF (and the ESM), this means that the participatory rights of 
the Bundestag must be related to the concrete form of the guarantees given, i.e. 
corresponding to their purpose, amount, goal, the way in which they are allocated, 
the recipients they may be intended for and the period of time for which a guaran-
tee10 is given. 
On this basis, the findings of the Federal Constitutional Court – in a convincing 
conclusion – take the form of a procedural conclusion whereby the Bundestag or 
its Committee on Budgets must in future first agree11 to accepting guarantees. In 
concrete terms, not only must every measure of assistance given in solidarity and 
9 BVerfGE 129, 124.
10 BVerfG, NJW 2011, 2946 (2950 f.).
11 BVerfG, NJW 2011, 2946 (2953).
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affecting federal expenditure on a larger scale in an international or EU context be 
approved individually by the Bundestag. There must also be a guarantee of suffi-
cient parliamentary influence as regards how the monies made available are han-
dled12. Even if the ruling with its reference (operating at the limits of interpretation 
in conformity with the constitution) to the Committee on Budgets at first sight 
seems to make a different impression, it may be assumed from other references13 
contained in it that the fundamental decisions as to whether and under what terms 
a state can receive emergency aid, as well as all other major decisions, must in 
future be taken in plenary session. Thus it is for the government to convince the 
Bundestag and in this way it is able to give its European policy increased demo-
cratic legitimacy. Only routine matters, such as the concrete payment of individual 
tranches, may only be discussed in the relevant committee and without recourse to 
discussion in plenary. From this point of view it is not surprising that the Federal 
Constitutional Court objected14 to the too broadly defined powers of the Committee 
of Nine.
The EFSF ruling, of course, leaves open what constitutional guidelines its inter-
pretation is based on. Just as in the case of the Lisbon ruling on the responsibility 
for integration, in which no clear constitutional point of reference beyond demo-
cratic principles is named, such a reference is also missing in the EFSF ruling on 
responsibility for the budget. The intention underpinning budgetary responsibility 
to strengthen the participatory rights of Parliament when granting emergency aid 
for reasons of democratic principle is worthy of approval. Budgetary responsibility 
which is disconnected as a norm ignores the systematically differentiating con-
cept of Article 23 of the Basic Law. The material linkage between the ESM and 
Monetary Union, which, when taken with a grain of salt, can also be seen in the 
EFSF, speaks in favour of understanding the creation of the ESM and its activities 
as being a matter for the EU, as provided for in Article 23 para 2 of the Basic Law. 
If European policy must now be understood as Europeanized domestic policy and 
increasingly less, from a democratic and power-sharing point of view, a case of 
foreign affairs, earlier participation on the part of the Bundestag is necessary. The 
guidelines introduced for this reason in the European Article of the Basic Law (cf. 
Article 23 paras 2 – 6) correspond to this view. On the one hand, the accompanying 
participation of the Bundestag and the Federal Assembly is based upon the idea 
of guaranteeing compensation for past and future losses of competences in the 
context of European integration. In view of the Bundestag’s budgetary sovereignty 
(cf. Article 115 of the Basic Law), its right of participation becomes stronger in the 
context of emergency aid with budgetary relevance within the framework of the 
EFSF and the ESM.  
On the other hand, according to Article 23 para 2, s. 2 of the Basic Law, the Bun-
destag and Federal Assembly have a comprehensive right of information via the 
Federal Government. Insofar as this right to information is to be limited through a 
core area of executive responsibility, this neither corresponds to the relationship 
12 BVerfG, NJW 2011, 2946 (2950 f.) paras. 122-128 of the ruling.
13 BVerfG, NJW 2011, 2946 (2950 f.). 
14 BVerfG, Ruling of 28/02/2012, Az 2 BvE 8/11, paras. 138 ff., 144ff. and 149 ff.
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of cooperative collaboration based on the idea of compensation underlying Article 
23 para 2 of the Basic Law, nor to an understanding of European policy as Europe-
anized domestic policy. For this reason, the core area of executive responsibility 
should not follow the broad guidelines of foreign affairs but instead, relatively nar-
row guidelines of domestic policy. Therefore, it is with good reason that the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court15 emphasizes in its ruling of 19 June 2012 that the time 
requirement “as early as possible” stated in Article 23 para 2, s. 2 of the Basic Law 
is to be interpreted to mean that the Bundestag must be informed, at the latest, at a 
point in time when it is still able to exert influence on government initiatives with 
external effect16.  As regards the degree of information required, a simple ratio is 
applicable: the more complex and relevant the material is for the competences of 
the German Bundestag, the more intensively the Federal Government must inform 
the Bundestag17.
In the context of the ratification of the ESM Treaty, the Bundestag was obliged 
to guarantee that these requirements would be met by enacting the correspond-
ing accompanying laws. In concrete terms, the participation of the Bundestag is 
enshrined in two laws: the Treaty of 2 February 2012 on the establishment of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) and the Treaty on financial participa-
tion in the European Stability Mechanism, the ESM Financing Treaty (ESMFinG).
The board of governors of the ESM decides on all financially relevant matters by 
common agreement, i.e. unanimously (Article 5 para 6, Article 4 para 3, ESM Trea-
ty). The German representative’s voting behaviour in the relevant committees is 
linked to the Bundestag’s rights of participation and is bound to a previous vote in 
parliament. §§ 3-7 ESMFinG provide for staggered approval by the Bundestag. In 
view of the “essential nature” of the decisions - depending on the extent to which 
the responsibilities for the budget and stability are affected – approval must be 
given either by a plenary session of the Bundestag, the Committee on Budgets or, 
in absolutely exceptionally circumstances, a confidential special committee of the 
Committee on Budgets. The constitutional background of this gradation is the prin-
cipal of public parliamentary and budget information. Only plenary sessions are 
publicly conducted as a matter of principle. The Committee on Budgets must first 
decide to meet publicly. For this reason the special committee meets in camera by 
its very nature. Approval is on the basis that the Bundestag is constantly informed 
by the government as early as possible. This also applies to the Federal Council (§ 
7 para 1 ESMFinG).  
15 For the scope of this claim to information, in particular with regard to the ESM and also the co-called “Euro 
Plus Pact”, see court proceedings between governmental bodies of the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary 
group; BVerfG, Ruling of 19/06/2012 – Az. 2 be 4/11. 
16 BVerfG, Ruling of 19/06/2012 – Az. 2 BvE 4/11, Rn. 127.
17 BVerfG, Ruling of 19/06/2012 – Az. 2 BvE 4/11, Rn. 117.
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Against this background, the fundamental decisions, in particular whether a state 
should receive emergency aid and also all other crucial decisions, are now taken at 
a first level in the Bundestag in plenary session. In particular, this now concerns 
fundamental decisions (“yes or no decisions”) about the granting of financial aid 
and also about accepting the so-called “Memorandum of Understanding” from the 
beneficiary state defining the terms it is to fulfil (Article 13 paras 2-4 of the ESM 
Treaty). Thus, whenever the discussion is “about money” according to § 4 para 1 
ESMFinG, responsibility falls to the plenum at a first level.  At a second level, inso-
far as ESM decisions merely implement fundamental decisions in accordance with 
Article 13 para 2 of the ESM Treaty and do not contain any major deviations, i.e. are 
“How do we do it?” questions, the prior approval of the Committee on Budgets is 
sufficient. At a third level, the special committee comprising members of the Com-
mittee on Budgets elected by the Bundestag, with confidential voting procedures, 
only takes decisions in accordance with the corresponding ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court18 in the case of secondary market purchases by the ESM, i.e. 
when it buys up circulating government bonds. 
18 BVerfGE 123, 267.
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6. The Role of the Bundestag in Comparative Legislation of the National 
Parliaments
A comparison of European legislation shows that in EU matters the Bundestag 
has now become a parliament with some of the strongest participatory rights in 
relation to the government (this is even more the case for the Federal Council as 
the second chamber of the parliament). In purely legal terms, the Danish and Aus-
trian parliaments, which for reasons of efficiency both take action through their 
respective EU committees, have greater participatory and monitoring rights as 
regards European legislative procedures than the German Bundestag. However, a 
fundamentally binding official opinion on the part of the Austrian Parliament is 
used extremely cautiously in deference to Austria’s capacity to act in the Council 
of the EU. The Danish parliament’s “negative” right to take the final decision, as a 
result of which no particular mandate can be positively imposed upon the govern-
ment, means in parliamentary practice, that as a consequence of the extensive 
consultations between the EU committee and the government, the government’s 
view is very rarely rejected. In this respect, a role is certainly played by the latent 
threat that in the case of binding decisions by parliament, the government might 
be outvoted in the Council due to an inability to comprise, and would then not be 
able to get its interests, contained in the usual “package deals”, through in the 
Council. Apart from this, from the point of view of comparative legislation, the Bun-
destag is a very strong parliament because, as a result of the legal rulings of the 
Federal Constitutional Court with regard to the dynamic provisions of the Treaty 
(cf. IntVG) and also in particular as regards financially relevant decisions taken by 
the Board of Governors of the ESM, it can take decisions which are binding on the 
government. In these fields the Bundestag has reached a unique position, which at 
EU level and also in other EU states has caused fears about Germany’s ability to act.
 
III. The Political and Practical Dimensions of Europeanizing the 
Bundestag
1. Potential to Monitor and Participate
It is widely assumed by the relevant researchers and also by the general public 
that, as a result of European policy, the Bundestag has suffered a continual loss of 
importance lasting until the present. We examined this theory from August 2012 
until January 2013. Using official documents we first examined to what extent the 
far-reaching legal changes of the past few years have affected political practices 
in European parliamentary policy. Secondly, we consulted more recent scientific 
studies which consider the dynamics since the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Thirdly, we conducted 20 interviews with players and cognoscenti of the Bunde-
stag’s European policy to make sure of the scientific findings and identify the play-
ers’ subjective estimates with regard to their own potential to act. 
On the basis of these three steps we put forward the proposition that the Bunde-
stag’s political actions can now no longer be seen as “empty” as is alleged in most 
of the more dated specialist literature. The changes in the law over the past few 
years have enabled the Bundestag to play both a monitoring and participatory role 
20
in German European policy. In our comprehensive study, which will be published 
in spring 2013, we substantiate this proposition with detailed studies of the prac-
tices of the administration of the German Bundestag, the inner organization of 
the political groupings and the activities of the committees of the Bundestag. In 
order to arrive at results in the broad field of European politics we have, moreover, 
compiled four case studies which reveal considerable activity on the part of the 
Bundestag in the following fields: the European Citizens’ Initiative in view of the 
EU’s Passenger Transportation Act; a quota for women in corporate management; 
the field of sovereign debt and euro crisis policy.19
We have not only formulated the aforementioned proposition against the back-
ground of the statements which we found in research literature and obtained from 
players in European politics. We would also like to point out at the same time that 
the Bundestag’s actions in European politics must always be understood in the 
context of a federal party state and cooperative parliamentarianism. The Bunde-
stag’s power of influence must be seen in the context of the complementary posi-
tion it has been given in the system in relation to the government. As a rule, their 
relationship is not one of competition but of mutual cooperation. In a federal party 
state, political action usually tends to be more executive in nature because, in the 
final analysis, all the parties govern through the federal state governments and 
the Federal Council and for this reason almost always have recourse to executive 
resources to formulate and enforce their positions. Cooperative parliamentarianism 
is characterized on the one hand by uniform block behaviour by the government 
and the parliamentary majority and on the other hand by oppositional groupings. 
In other words, the theory of “emptiness” has quite probably from the very outstart 
given too little consideration to the fact that in a system of interlinked power, the 
position of Parliament is limited (and for good reason) from the start. Nevertheless, 
we believe that, with a view to a normative strengthening of the European project, 
it is to be welcomed that in the last few years, the parliamentary level has enjoyed 
a considerable increase in importance over the administrative sphere. 
Against this background, we have put together in this study a considerable amount 
of evidence to show that in view of these structural shifts, the Bundestag pursues 
what could even be called a comparatively active form of European policy. This first 
applies to the symbolic level. One aspect of this is the special position of the EU 
Committee emphasized by the Basic Law. The regular government announcements 
from the Chancellor, not only before and after crisis meetings but before every 
meeting of the European Council, are arguably of even greater symbolic signifi-
cance.  Since the heads of the political groupings are always actively involved in 
the government’s announcements, politicians involved in European policy enjoy 
regular access to the leading members and committees of the political groupings, 
which increases their individual visibility. However, as is the custom in a party 
state, “European policy politicians” run the risk in all political groupings that, par-
ticularly in the case of very important issues, they will be eclipsed, because – as 
during the euro crisis – the top politicians take up the issue and pursue it using 
the logic of party political competition and not the logic and method of the Euro-
pean Community. 
19 The four case studies were compiled by Linn Selle, Johanna Kardel, Daniela Kietz and a further author.
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However, the Bundestag’s involvement with European politics is not merely sym-
bolic. A remarkably wide range of European policy content and instruments can 
be observed in its everyday parliamentary business. In a survey in 201120 the Bun-
destag administration listed the surprisingly high number of more than 29,000 
communications to the Bundestag from all institutions at EU level. These include 
the 200 or so “comprehensive evaluations” on the part of the Federal Government 
as well as four early warning reports from the Permanent Representation in Brus-
sels – i. e. the documents in which the Federal Government gives detailed reports 
on individual EU dossiers. 21
Many publications describe the large number of communications as being of little 
significance. The two most important arguments are as follows: a) the Bundestag 
is unable to make sense of the large volume of information and therefore turns 
to informal paths of action b) for institutional reasons or through force of habit, 
the members of the Bundestag omit to make effective use of their access rights, 
which are actually well established. We now tend to view these explanations as out 
of date. In all the interviews we asked central players in European policy if they 
could give us examples of striking shortcomings as regards receiving information, 
processing information or the formulation of policy used for the EU. None of the 
players were able to quote a current dossier in which impulses originating from 
the EU were not being dealt with, or were being dealt with inappropriately as the 
law stands. From our point of view, in recent years no major problems, such as the 
European Arrest Warrant or the Services Directive in the past, could be identified. 
We attribute the still prevalent scepticism about the Bundestag’s potential to act 
in one respect to the after-effects of the two dossiers named. We also attribute it 
to some degree to a mindset whereby higher significance is attributed to the Bun-
destag in the shaping of policy in general – and not European policy (see below). 
This notion can be credited with having a strong normative effect but if that is the 
case, the supposed deficits as regards participation are not the fault of European 
integration but rather that of the entire political system. 
The great increase in legislative and quasi-legislative regulations, which have 
strengthened the Bundestag in relation to the government, still constitute an argu-
ment against the idea of a continual loss of importance. In the EUZBBG this is 
particularly the case at the levels of information and communication, where the 
Bundestag was able to compel the government to be duty-bound to provide com-
prehensive information. In reality, any concessions on the part of the government 
have so far followed extremely unwillingly, the most recent and arguably the best 
example of which is the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 19 
June 2012. In view of the assumptions theoretically made by bureaucracies, it is 
hardly surprising if governments do not voluntarily share their positions of power 
and information with other players. 
20  More recent data is unfortunately not available.
21 Administration of the Bundestag, 2011, First Report on the Implementation of the Acts to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Berlin German Bundestag (also Committee for Affairs of the EU, Committee bulletin 17(21)1211), p. 103.
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Finally, it should be pointed out that over the last few years, the Bundestag has 
taken important measures in the field of administration to give members of parlia-
ment sufficient information and enable them to participate. In 2005 an establish-
ment team was set up by the administrative director of the Bundestag to support 
the participation of the Bundestag in affairs of the EU. In 2006 this was merged 
into the Department for Europe, which was to participate in “improving the Bunde-
stag’s European capability and help reduce deficits of information and monitoring 
in affairs of the EU”.22
Since the beginning of 2007 the Department has been supported23 by a liaison 
office in Brussels, which, in terms of organization, is part of it and is intended to 
act as a direct source of information for the Bundestag. At the beginning of 2013, 
Department PA1 was upgraded to “Subdivision PE (Europe)”. This now comprises 
a total of six departments24: the Committee Secretariat of the EU Committee (PE 1), 
the Department of EU Policy Matters and Affairs of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (PE 2), the Department of EU Analysis, Consultation and Priority-setting for 
EU Projects (PE 3), the EU Liaison Office (PE 4), Europe Documentation (PE 5) and 
the “Department for Europe” (PE 6). Departments PE 2-5 are a more detailed dif-
ferentiation of the old PA 1 Department, which was closed in January 2013. Depart-
ment PE 6 came about when the old WD 11 Department, i.e. the European Research 
Services Department, was relocated. Thus the Bundestag has taken a step which, 
as regards work on the government’s European policy had frequently been sug-
gested but never realized: the grouping of all units relevant to the EU under one 
hierarchical roof. This, however, does not mean that the decision has been taken 
for members of parliament to use this administrative basis to go beyond their for-
mal rights of information and independently generate information in the context 
of decision-making procedures. Nevertheless, the network for the acquisition of 
information relevant to the EU would seem to be sufficiently tightly knit. 
Despite the fact that we have been able to identify a high level of information in the 
Bundestag, this still says little about its real meaning in the institutional structure. 
There is no apparent answer as to whether the Bundestag’s greatly increased level 
of information over the past few years has resulted in a relative strengthening of 
its power. “Parliament” vs. “Government” – this is a very exceptional constellation 
in a parliamentary system of interlinked powers. However, this does not mean 
that it never happens. It either comes about in situations without a clear parlia-
mentary majority (which has not happened in the Federal Republic since 1953) 
or in situations in which the government explicitly does not cooperate with the 
parliamentary majority, which is actually inclined to support it. The clear disgrun-
tlement of parts of the government’s parties as regards what was taken to be the 
intergovernmental nature of the ESM and the Fiscal Pact can be quoted as one of 
the few instances. 
22 As described by the Bundestag in its brochure, cf. https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/10090000.pdf
23 The establishment of the liaison office was decided by the Bundestag on 12 May 2005 (BT-Drs. 15/5493).
24 See Bundestag Administration Organization Chart of January 2013.
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However, the dossiers in which the parliamentary majority acts in unity with 
the government would seem to be of greater everyday relevance. To comprehend 
the Bundestag’s options in European policy it is necessary to submit the various 
groups within the Bundestag to more careful scrutiny.  
2. Groups of Players within the Bundestag
In order to understand the processes and results of German European policy it 
is necessary to consider the various groups within the Bundestag. First a binary 
code must be applied whereby politicians in the majority pull together, whilst the 
minority parties play their role as the opposition. However, this interpretation of 
roles does not lead to a fundamental form of opposition in cooperative parliamen-
tarianism. On the contrary, in a working parliament collaborative work takes place 
above all in committees, which is why in both European and also other fields of 
politics it is not seldom for voting behaviour to be consensual.
Nevertheless, the majority/opposition relationship is noticeably more complex in 
European policy than in many other political fields. One reason for this is the long 
time it takes to process dossiers in the European political cycle. In her case study 
on European transport policy, Johanna Kardel identifies several factors which (can) 
prevent majority and opposition MPs from automatically working against each 
other. Above all, if a dossier is in circulation for more than ten years, all the MPs 
are in a situation of already having once viewed certain resolutions both from the 
point of view of the opposition and the government. If this is anticipated, the range 
of possible political solutions is narrowed and there is a strong tendency towards 
consensual results. Federal interlinking also compels players to act consensually. 
And finally, despite Germany’s strong position in the Council, German players are 
to some extent confronted with guidelines from Brussels which are outside the 
sphere of influence even of the MPs in the majority. This can happen when the 
demands of a previous government have to be taken up by the Commission or the 
Presidency and have to be dealt with by a new parliamentary majority. However, a 
constellation can also arise whereby certain positions are propagated by the Com-
mission in a fundamentally different way from German players. In the final analy-
sis, this means that a gap arises or can arise between how MPs perceive their role 
and how their actions are in actual fact influenced. Whereas on the political stage 
- both inside and outside Parliament – great mention is made of the fundamental 
difference between government and opposition MPs, their relationship is far more 
consensual at working level. 
Secondly, a line can be drawn between within Parliament between the “Europe 
politicians” and the rest of parliament. To a certain extent the “Europe politicians” 
cut across the political groupings or the division between the administration and 
politics. They have deeper knowledge of political operations in Brussels and are 
(for the most part) integration-friendly in their attitude. Within their political 
groupings they thus belong to the driving forces for integration, which puts them 
at a varying distance from their party leaders – also depending on the term in 
office. In many cases but not always, the “Europe politicians” are in relevant posi-
tions, such as Spokesperson on European policy, Chairlady for European Policy, 
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Deputy Parliamentary Group Leader responsible for EU Affairs. However, these 
are not the only roles among the ranks of “Europe politicians”. We were told in 
one interview that we could assume there are approx. 100 MPs who now know the 
ropes as regards European affairs in their respective political fields. In the coming 
years we will see to what extent the recent real and symbolic expansion of compe-
tences has led to “Europe politicians” becoming leaders of opinion on EU topics. A 
further scenario might consist in parliamentarians packing European policy with 
national interests much more strongly than before, which would run contrary to 
the implicit integrationism of the “Europe politicians”. In this context, it must be 
noted that the integrationist impulse of German MPs in the past has always been 
far above average. Against the backdrop of the Federal Republic’s German tradi-
tion, any renationalization might well be interpreted as a step backwards. As far 
as European comparisons are concerned, this could be described as normalization. 
A third distinction can be made at the players’ level as regards the executive ori-
entation of the MPs and the political groupings. At this level, it is also impossi-
ble to categorize particular people or groups permanently because staff changes 
or differently defined functions can just as easily lead to new categorizations as 
changes brought about by elections. Nevertheless, some changes are noticeable. 
First of all, by their very nature, the leaders of the political groupings in govern-
ment have a natural sensitivity to the needs of the executive, because the stability 
of the government and the continuation of the coalition are closely linked. This 
consequently gives an important nuance to the group of “Europe politicians” just 
described, because the deputy parliamentary group leaders responsible for EU 
affairs see themselves as being subject to coalition discipline, which is at odds with 
the independence which many MPs, in particular “Europe politicians”, often claim 
they should have. 
However, our interviews have shown that opposition politicians also belong to the 
group of MPs orientated towards the executive. These are once again in particular 
the leaders of political groupings but, quite understandably, only of the political 
groupings hoping to form part of the government in the foreseeable future. Since 
the MPs in the leaderships of the political groupings are potential candidates for 
government office in the event of a change in government, a kind of anticipatory 
self-restriction can be found and only the “Die Linke” (the Left Party) parliamen-
tary group acts in a style that is distant from the executive. The leading politicians 
of the mainstream parties probably well remember 2005/06 when the coalition of 
CDU/CSU and FDP abruptly came to power and basically, against its own interests, 
had to strengthen Parliament against the government because the same political 
players had vociferously demanded an upgrading of Parliament during the 2002-
2005 parliamentary period.
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3. Profiles of the Stances on European Policy in the German Parliament
When attempting to categorize groups it should not be forgotten that in all parties 
there are MPs representing ideas with a wide range of different content. When 
looking, as it were, at the core brands of the different parties, their content can be 
categorized according to the parties and their programmes.  However, this does 
not apply to all topics and, consequently, also not as regards the EU, which often 
crops up as a matter cutting across divisions on all issues. It was therefore not 
surprising to us to find a wide range of decisions on content, as far as the role of 
the Bundestag or Parliament in European politics as a whole is concerned. The 
topics we have found are described here. Thus five core arguments can be found 
regarding dealing with the EU and Europeanizing German politics can be found 
within Parliament and in German European policy in general (see table). The first 
concerns the core of nation state politics both in the context of Europeanization 
and globalization. Here, the focus is on sovereignty of the people, which under 
democratic conditions means that the representatives of the people - i.e. the MPs – 
are to be restricted as little as possible in their freedom to take decisions on behalf 
of the German people. This is the position adopted by the Federal Constitutional 
Court in Germany but there are also some supporters of this view in Parliament. 
Secondly, in the parliamentary arena, the attitude is to be found that that a “Euro-
pean Germany” corresponds to Germany’s reason of state. The concept of national 
sovereignty, which was a taboo topic in Germany right up until the 1990s, is, how-
ever, defined differently here to the first narrative. On the one hand, German inter-
ests are placed explicitly in the context of international politics, in which both Ger-
many and Europe have to fight competition from other regions of the world. On the 
other hand, the emphasis shifts to the executive, meaning the field determined by 
the Constitution when European policy changes to (Europeanized) foreign policy. 
The “Union method” praised by Angela Merkel in her speech25 in Bruges consti-
tutes one expression of this guiding principle. This view of a “Europeanized Ger-
many” is consequently especially well represented in the parliamentary parties in 
government. As stated above, this attitude is also to be found in the leadership of 
other parliamentary groupings with the exception of the “Die Linke” parliamen-
tary group.
A third approach sees German European policy also firmly rooted in EU institu-
tions but does not share the intergovernmental preferences of the above-mentioned 
position. Whereas Angela Merkel in her Brussels speech points out the limitations 
of  the Community method and thus also of the central role of the Commission, 
the opposite position can be found in the Bundestag, which sees the future path of 
development of the EU very much in the further strengthening of the Community 
method. This view may not be as dominant as it was a decade or so ago. Neverthe-
less, it is still very much in evidence particularly among “Europe politicians” and 
is used as a counter-argument to Merkel’s Union method.
A fourth approach to Germany’s European policy is more closely linked to the 
general separation of powers.  Here, the argument goes that, in general, European 
25 http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2010/11/2010-11-02-merkel-bruegge.html.
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integration has shown greater preference to the executive rather than to elected 
representatives. Unlike some political theorists, parliamentarians do not advocate 
this state of affairs but, instead, criticize it harshly. One prominent proponent of 
the position that the Bundestag must be fundamentally strengthened in relation 
to the executive - at both German and EU level - is the President of the Bunde-
stag, Norbert Lammert. This line of argument is also used by the plaintiffs at the 
Federal Constitutional Court. To a certain extent, this position is at odds with the 
integrationist attitude of some “Europe politicians”, because they argue in favour 
of taking seriously the multi-tiered system created in the Treaties as a transna-
tional arrangement of institutions. Although national parliaments thus have an 
important function with regard to upholding subsidiarity, they are otherwise inte-
grated in a multi-tiered parliamentary system which does not attribute any special 
legitimizing role to them. 
A final position to be found sees the Bundestag as one of the many institutions with 
which the participation of citizens in European politics can be increased. In our 
study, we observed this attitude above all in the negotiations about the structuring 
of the European Citizens’ Initiative. 
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The tabular summary also shows that all the positions stated face specific chal-
lenges. Thus no stance can be said to constitute, as it were, a stable point of con-
vergence for a fundamental attitude towards the EU or European integration in the 
future. Rather, there is good reason to assume that, in the field of European policy, 
several attitudes will exist side-by-side in the foreseeable future, which will only be 
partly compatible with each other or co-exist uncomfortably. Thus, the Bundestag 
basically reflects the multitude of opinions which have existed at EU level for quite 
some time. The Bundestag has therefore been just as unsuccessful at reaching 
agreement on the final form of Europe as the epistemic community in Brussels.
IV. Results and Conclusions
For the purposes of discussion, some of the results of our study and the further 
considerations linked to them are contained in the following in the form of three 
propositions and several recommended courses of action. The propositions are 
intended to enliven scientific debate. We therefore concentrate on points which in 
our view seem to co-exist uncomfortably with existing positions. We relate the rec-
ommended courses of action to players in European policy and, in so doing, have 
concentrated on aspects which are still on the agenda despite the great and varied 
increase in information, monitoring and participation in recent years.
Proposition 1: The Bundestag is currently changing from a monitoring to a 
participating player.
In the current jurisprudential view, if the existing theory of compensation as per 
Article 23 paras 2 – 6 of the Basic Law is analyzed in terms of practical political 
science, it can only be seen as having limited validity for many – but not all – 
Narrative Core Points of Convergence Problem/Challenges
Sovereignty of the people and its 
representatives
Decisions by parliament or individual 
MPs
Incorporating dual legitimacy as per 
Article 10 para 2 TEU
Defending and strengthening German 
interests in Europe and the world
Policy goals: developing the economy, 
strengthening global competitiveness, 
securing power to act in foreign affairs 
and security policy 
Dealing with diverging or antipodal 
interests of other member EU member 
states
Shift towards intergovernmental 
decision-making formats (“Union 
method”)
Creating and strengthening European 
political community
Integrating Parliament into multi-tiered 
European parliamentarianism
Dealing with the politicization of 
European policy; extending political 
struggle to European policy
Parliament as a political place as 
opposed to government as an 
administrative field
Rescuing politics from the “claws” of 
multi-tiered administration
Limited parliamentary resources
Defending participation despite 
Europeanization and globalization
Strengthening parties (and possibly civil 
society) in European politics
Seemingly greater effectiveness and 
efficiency of the Community method
Table: Narrative Cores in German European Policy
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players in German European policy. The theory of compensation states that Arti-
cle 23 of the Basic Law, which was added in 1993, grants the Bundestag rights of 
information and monitoring to compensate for the loss of legislative rights due to 
the transfer of competences to the EU. Since the Bundestag no longer has the final 
right of decision in EU affairs, it is only able to accept responsibility for integration 
if – these days in keeping EUZBBG guidelines - it is informed comprehensively 
and in timely fashion to enable it, if necessary, to influence decisions made by the 
government. The empirical study shows that certain players in the Bundestag opt 
for a pro-active European policy going beyond the theory of compensation. 
From a legal point of view, the role of the Bundestag has developed from a moni-
toring to a participatory role in EU affairs. Procedural and institutional measures 
are of decisive importance for effective participation. They must ensure that, as 
regards European policy, the Bundestag organises itself in such a way as to be 
able to respond appropriately to its specific peculiarities. Thus, it is particularly 
important for the Bundestag to be comprehensively informed at an early point in 
time about legislation planned at EU level so that it can then position itself on the 
basis of expertly coordinated internal procedures, in order, in the final analysis, to 
be able to act quickly and efficiently in this position in the ways described, i.e. in a 
direct way employing an objection about subsidiarity and indirectly via its internal 
possibilities of participation through the German government representative in 
the institutions and through coordination with the European Parliament. All in all, 
the reform steps of the past few years would seem to us to be suited to strengthen-
ing the Bundestag in its future role as an active participant in European politics. 
Proposition 2: In order to understand its European policy, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at various subgroups of the Bundestag.
When considering German European policy, a large part of the relevant literature 
tends to see the Bundestag as a uniform player – either in the context of the separa-
tion of powers or on the basis of the observation that German politics would seem 
to be a largely consensual affair. In contrast to this, our analysis makes it clear 
that, as far as European policy is concerned, the Bundestag has no “standard view” 
and should rather be seen as a differentiated structure. Within Parliament there 
are various groups of players, who have a complex, complementary and competi-
tive relationship with each other and the government. In this respect, distinction 
should be made not only between the political groupings of government and oppo-
sition. In addition to this, the “Europe politicians” also constitute a group whose 
view of European politics differs from that of the other players in Parliament. 
Proposition 3: The discussion about the role of the Bundestag’s European 
policy should be conducted in the context of the wider debate on the value 
of parliaments in multi-tiered European politics.
For a long time, the debate about the Bundestag’s position has concerned itself 
with the question as to whether Parliament should have “more” rights of partici-
pation or whether, on the contrary, a freer government can have a more effective 
European policy. However, from the point of view of the players in the Bundestag, 
there are further conflicts, e.g. as regards the disproportionate significance of the 
executive in politics or the status of politics at EU level in general for German 
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politics. It therefore seems less plausible to concentrate on having “more” or “less” 
Bundestag in European policy because in the case of the vast majority of dossiers, 
decision-making and voting are either consensual or follow the “normal” pattern 
of opposite stances by the coalition and the opposition. Consequently, important 
topics, such as the gradual shift of policy towards the multi-tiered executive, the 
competition for legitimacy between the national parliaments and between the 
national parliaments and the European Parliament, are overlooked. The normative 
debate about the status of representative democracy in the European Union is nev-
ertheless still topical and necessary. It should be sought and promoted beyond the 
borders of nation states, because the legitimacy of the European project is closely 
linked to the role of national parliaments. 
Recommended course of action 1: The Bundestag should concentrate more 
on essential dossiers, central to the legitimization of German and European 
policy, instead of trying to cover “everything”.
On the one hand, in view of the multiplicity of European activities and their com-
plexity and, on the other hand, the limited capacity of the Bundestag, it is impor-
tant for the Bundestag to concentrate on essential issues and “separate the wheat 
from the chaff”. In view of the fact that not every legislative measure planned at 
EU level is relevant for the Bundestag, there is a good chance that, by monitor-
ing the European legislative programme using pre-defined political preferences, 
sensitivities and interests and particular criteria (e.g. subsidiarity, sensitivity to 
basic rights), important legislative initiatives can be filtered out and identified in 
good time. In this way - despite the rather short 8-week deadline - the Bundestag 
can take up position to make an objection about subsidiarity in good time and 
coordinate with other national parliaments. Thus, on the one hand, processes with 
European relevance are consistently mainstreamed in the Bundestag and on the 
other hand, there is more meaningful networking with other national parliaments 
– perhaps even beyond COSAC. 
Recommended course of action 2: The position of the EU Committee in 
relation to the specialist committees should be reconsidered with a view to 
its being effectively strengthened – as already provided for in the Basic Law 
(Article 45 ).
When speaking about mainstreaming processes with European relevance in the 
Bundestag, the idea of strengthening the role of the EU Committee in collaboration 
with the special committees should once again be given some thought. Despite the 
fact that on European policy issues which fall within the remit of other specialist 
committees, the EU Committee is still able to play an advisory role, its achieve-
ments over the last few years has been perceived in varying ways. Some see it as 
the government’s partner when formulating and implementing European policy 
and praise it for the prominent position it has achieved through its work. Others 
criticize it for not having been able to fulfil its specific tasks and, in particular, for 
not using its special powers. 
Article 45, s. 2 of the Basic Law contains the possibility of empowering the EU Com-
mittee to enable it to make use of plenary powers over the government. Thus, along 
the lines of the Danish and Austrian models, the participation of the Bundestag 
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could be made more efficient and effective. The potential contained in Article 45, s. 
3 of the Basic Law has also not yet been exhausted as regards the everyday legisla-
tive procedures of the EU. On the one hand, one of the EU Committee’s functions is 
to be a ”committee for integration” charged with dealing with affairs of European 
integration. On the other hand, in cases exceeding this remit, it merely constitutes 
a “cross section committee” coordinating the consultative processes of the special-
ist committees. In consequence, there still remains a decentralized, even fragmen-
tary approach to dealing with union documents in the Bundestag.
Recommended course of action 3: With regard to the ESM, it would make 
sense to create a mixed Stability Committee.
The way in which the Committee on Budgets has been seen to develop in the 
course of the Eurozone Crisis is interesting but at the same time not unproblem-
atic. Firstly, since the ESMFinG it has received powers hitherto denied to the EU 
Committee despite the explicit ruling on Article 45, s. 2 of the Basic Law. Secondly, 
the Committee on Budgets – which technically speaking has responsibility for the 
budget – is now in real competition with the EU Committee. This latter’s role, how-
ever, is comparatively weak, despite the fact that, as regards the rescue packages, 
it is a question of fundamental issues concerning Economic and Monetary Union 
and thus also European integration. The same applies to the role of the Committee 
on Legal Affairs, whose competence is also needed in the euro zone crisis. Against 
this background, thought should be given to setting up a mixed “Stability Commit-
tee” made up of representatives of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee for 
Affairs of the European Union and the Committee on Legal Affairs, supplemented 
by the leaders of the parliamentary groupings or parliamentary whips (these lat-
ter without voting rights) and equipping them with the appropriate powers. Our 
initial assessment is that this would be legally permissible, given the Bundestag’s 
procedural autonomy, but would, however, require closer scrutiny of the concrete 
constitutional requirements where applicable. 
Recommended course of action 4: European legislation should, wherever 
possible, enjoy the same treatment and status as national legislation.  
All EU legislative projects considered to be relevant should be processed and treat-
ed in committee or plenary session in the same way as national legislative projects. 
European legislation should, as it were, be made into national legislation. This will 
also give MPs the opportunity – which they have not had until now – to raise their 
profile with European issues. 
Recommended course of action 5: The dependence of the Bundestag’s 
European policy on a small number of experts from the different political 
groupings should be reduced.
In the inner organization of all the Bundestag’s political groupings, European pol-
icy is organised like any other normal field of policy. For environmental or health 
policy, for example, there is an expert on European policy for internal communica-
tions and a spokesperson for external communications. These are supplemented 
by the responsible top politicians in the leadership and management of the parlia-
mentary groupings. In contrast to most fields of policy, however, European policy 
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is a cross section concentrating on processing information with EU relevance in 
a broad range of spheres and turning it into monitoring or participatory action. In 
consequence, if all issues with EU relevance are channelled to individual members, 
this can quickly lead to their becoming overburdened or dealing with individual 
dossiers superficially. In our view there is empirical evidence for this. Our inter-
views show that, in the estimate of expert observers, how much clout the individ-
ual political groupings have on European policy strongly depends on whether they 
have people with a “passion” for European politics and above-average commitment 
in the positions described. 
At least in the larger political groupings in the Bundestag, dependency on individu-
al experts and spokespersons could be reduced if more people with a coordinating 
function were deployed in political fields closely connected with the EU. Just as the 
Committee on Legal Affairs has a subcommittee with responsibility for EU affairs, 
experts with specialist political knowledge could be supported by further MPs with 
special expertise on European policy in the various fields of policy (e.g. expert on 
“European Transport Policy”). In this way, there would be an incentive for individ-
ual MPs to become better acquainted with the complex tectonics of European poli-
tics. Cross connections with a particular focus on specialist fields of policy could be 
established with other parliaments which the specialists or spokespersons could 
not maintain in their current position due to a lack of capacity. 
Recommended course of action 6: Article 23 of the Basic Law should 
be adapted to meet the requirements arising from the drive towards 
Europeanization brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon.
In view of their significance, as previously described, subsidiarity objections, as 
defined in Article 23, para 1a of the Basic Law, could be constitutionally enshrined. 
The one-sided provision for an action against infringements of the subsidiarity 
principle in the Basic Law arguably shifts the focus too much onto ex-post scrutiny 
without given adequate consideration to the political potential of a subsidiarity 
complaint. In addition, Article 23 para 3 of the Basic Law could be changed in such 
a way as to make it necessary for the government to “give due consideration” to the 
official opinion of the Bundestag – and also of the Federal Council – in particularly 
sensitive areas of domestic policy, in order to give the Bundestag fundamental 
authority under the procedure provided for in § 9 para 4 EUZBBG as in the Aus-
trian system (and corresponding to the Federal Council in Article 23 para 5, s. 2 
of the Basic Law). 
Recommended course of action 7: In the interests of greater clarity and the 
coherent manageability of the rights of participation of the German Bun-
destag and Federal Council, the hitherto enacted accompanying legislation 
should be converted into a uniform German Code on European Law.
The existence side-by-side of the multiplicity of laws to regulate the rights of par-
ticipation in EU affairs (Basic Law, EUZBBG, EUZBLG, IntVG, Rules of Procedure 
for the Bundestag and the Federal Council as well as the ongoing BBV and BLV) 
can, in the long term, only be seen as a provisional solution. For this reason, the 
Bundestag and the Federal Council should draw up a coherent “German Code on 
European Law” to eliminate the current contradictions in the laws.
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V. Literature
With regard to relevant scientific literature for the topic described in this discus-
sion paper, please refer to our detailed study.  
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VI. Appendix 
German Constitutional Court Rulings since 1993 
with relevance for European policy
Maastricht
12 October 1993 
2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 
Plaintiffs: MPs et al 
•	Solange	II	Confirmation	-	legislation	on	protection	of	
fundamental	rights	
•	Democratic	principle:	legitimization	via	two	channels,	
nevertheless	currently	primarily	via	national	parliaments,		
EP	is	included;	supporting	role	of	EP	which	can	be	extended
•	Negation	of	EU	Kompetenz-Kompetenz
European Arrest Warrant
 
18 July 2005
2 BvR 2236/04
Plaintiff: German and Syrian national D.
•	The	European	Arrest	Warrant	Law	is	declared	null	and	void	
because:
•	 it	interferes	disproportionately	with	extradition	autonomy	
(Article	16	para	2	the	Basic	Law)
•	 it	infringes	legal	guarantee	(Article	19	para	4	the	Basic	Law)
•	Bundestag	is	responsible	for	implementing	European	law	
constitutionally
Lisbon 
30 June 2009 
2 BvE 2/08 etc.
Plaintiffs: The Left parliamentary group, several MPs
•	Compatibility	of	Act	Approving	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	with		
the	Basic	Law
•	Partial	infringement	by	accompanying	laws	against	Article	38	
para	1	in	conjunction	with	Article	23	para	1	the	Basic	Law
•	Thereafter	changes	to	laws	(EUZBBG	and	IntVG)	
Constitutional complaint about measures to help  
Greece and the euro rescue package
 
07 September 2011 
2 BvR 987/10 etc.
Plaintiffs: Group of economists and legal scholars; 1 MP
•	Constitutional	complaint	rejected
•	Monetary	union,	financial	stability	law	and	European	Stability	
Mechanism	law	are	constitutional,	Article	38	para	1	not	
infringed,	budgetary	autonomy	and	rights	of	Bundestag	upheld
•	Guidelines	on	interpretation	of	§1	para	4	European	Stability	
Mechanism	(government	to	obtain	advance	consent	of	
Committee	on	Budgets)
Organ controversy, Bundestag’s rights of participation/EFSF
28 February 2012 
2 BvE 8/11 etc. 
Plaintiffs: 2 MPs
•	Regulations	on	special	committee	(Committee	for	Urgent	
Decisions)	partly	infringe	MPs	rights
Organ controversy, ESM, Euro Plus Pact
19 June 2012 
2 BvE 4/11 
Plaintiff: Alliance 90/The Greens  parliamentary group
•	Violation	of	entitlement	of	Bundestag	to	be	informed	by	Federal	
Government	re.	ESM	and	Euro	Plus	Pact
•	Categorized	by	Federal	Constitutional	Court	as	affair	of	the	EU	
and	thereby	covered	by	Article	23	para	2	s.	1	the	Basic	Law
Applications for interim measure to prevent ratification  
of ESM and Fiscal Pact
12 September 2012 
2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1824/12 etc. 
Plaintiffs: The Left parliamentary group,  
further groups incl. MPs
•	Applications	rejected	on	condition	that	international	law	
guarantees	that
•	 liability	capital	remains	limited
•	the	rights	of	information	of	Bundestag	are	not	violated		
by	ESM	Treaty
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(Quasi-) Legal Provisions for the Participation of the Bundestag  
1948 – 2000
Act of Assent to 
Treaty of Rome
German	Federal		
Law	Gazette	(1957)
Rights of information and disclosure
Article	2:	Rights	of	information	of	Bundestag;	duty	of	Bundestag	to	supply	
ongoing	information	on	developments	in	Council;	time	of	information
Articles 23 and 
45 of the Basic 
Law
Law	on	Amendment	of	the	Basic	
Law	of	21/12/1992
German	Federal	
Law	Gazette	(1992)
Article 23
(1)	Participation	of	German	Federal	Republic	in	development	of	
Union,	transfer	of	sovereignty,	reference	to	79II	and	III
(2)	Participation	of	Bundestag	and	Federal	Assembly,	duty	of	
Government	to	provide	information	at	earliest	possible	moment
(3)	Federal	Government	gives	Bundestag	opportunity	to	give	official	opinion	
before	participating	in	legislative	acts,	consideration	of	official	opinions	
Article 45 
EU	Committee,	authorization,	making	use	of	the	rights	of	the	
Bundestag	as	per	Article	23	in	relation	to	the	Federal	Government
EUZBBG German	Federal		
Law	Gazette	(1993)
EU Committee and Official Opinions
Appointing	EU	Committee,	authorization	to	deliver	official	opinions
Information/Rights of information
Government	provides	comprehensive	information	at	earliest	possible	
moment	on	all	projects	in	the	context	of	the	EU	which	could	be	of	
interest	to	FRG;	regulation	of	principles	of	dispatch	and	information
Right to state opinion
Federal	Government	gives	Bundestag	opportunity	to	state	official	
opinion	before	approving	acts	of	legislation;	time	limit	regulation,	
Federal	Government	bases	negotiation	on	official	opinion	
Further sources:
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(1957):	Act	on	Treaty	of	25	March	1957	establishing	the	European	Economic	Community	and	the	European	
Atomic	Energy	Community.	Bonn:	BGBl.	1957	II	no.	23,	753	ff.
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(1992):	Law	on	Amendment	of	German	Constitution	21/12/1992.	Bonn:	BGBI.	1992	I	no.	58,	2086-2087
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(1993):	Act	on	Co-operation	between	the	Federal	Government	and	the	Federal	States	in	Affairs	of	the	EU	of	
12/03/1993.	Bonn:	BGBl.	1993	I	no.	9,	311-312
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(Quasi-) Legal Provisions for the Participation of the Bundestag  
2000 – 2012
Articles 23 
and 45 the 
Basic Law
Amended:	28/08/2006
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	
(2006a)
Article 23
Regulation	on	use	of	rights	by	Federal	Government
Amended:	08/10/2008
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	
(2008)
Article 23
Added:	Right	of	complaint	of	Bundestag	and	Federal	Assembly	on	violation	of	
principle	of	subsidiarity
 
Article 45 
Added:	Use	of	rights	in	founding	Treaties	of	the	EU	by	committee
EUZBBG Amended	by	law	of	17/11/2005
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	
(2005)
Reference	to	right	of	approval	of	regulation	of	details	re.	information	and	partici-
pation	of	Bundestag	for	BBV
Amended	by	law	of	22/09/2009
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	
(2009b)
Information/Rights of information
Basically	conveys	BBV,	above	all	precise	regulations	on	GASP	and	GSVP	are	new		
Amended	by	law	on	Treaty	of	2	
March	2012	re.	stability,	coordina-
tion	and	control	in	Economic	and	
Monetary	Union
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	
(2012b)
Information/Rights of information
Extension	of	concept	of	EU	projects	to	include,	among	other	things,	international	
treaties	and	other	agreements	if	they	are	closely	related	to	Union	law	and	topics	
of	discussion	etc.	in	the	context	of	the	Fiscal	Pact	
Extension	of	duties	to	provide	information	to	the	Euro	Group,	Euroland	Summit	
and	meetings	of	the	member	countries	in	connection	with	the	above-mentioned	
projects
BBV	 German	Federal	Law	Gazette	
(2006a)
Information/Rights of information
Early,	ongoing	and	written	information	on	all	projects,	dispatch	of	documents
Transmission	of	report	sheets	and	comprehensive	evaluation.	
Information	on	legislative	acts	and	implementation,	procedure	at	European	Court	
of	Justice	about	planned	transition	from	unanimity	to	majority	decision,	accession	
and	treaty	revisions
Right to state opinion
At	early	stage	of	negotiations,	adequate	period	of	time;	Federal	Government	
bases	its	negotiations	on	official	opinion	of	Bundestag.
Bundestag	gives	reasons	if	all	the	concerns	contained	in	official	opinion	are	not	
taken	into	account
Requirement of parliamentary approval
If,	in	accordance	with	Article	23	para	3,	s.	1	German	Constitution,	the	Bundestag	
makes	use	of	its	opportunity	to	state	an	official	opinion,	the	Federal	Government	
will	enter	a	parliamentary	reservation	in	the	Council,	if	one	of	the	main	aspects	
of	a	Bundestag	resolution	cannot	be	enforced.	Before	the	Council’s	final	decision	
the	Government	will	endeavour	to	reach	agreement	with	the	Bundestag.	Right	
of	Federal	Government	to	deviate	from	this	for	important	foreign	or	integration	
policy	reasons.	
36
Law on the extension and 
strengthening of the rights of  
the Bundestag and the Federal  
Assembly in affairs of the  
European Union
As	of:	01/12/2009
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2009c)
Bundestag/Federal Council Consultation 
TThe	Bundestag	and	the	Federal	Council	are	to	deliberate	and	pass	resolutions	
in	an	appropriate	period	of	time	and	give	due	consideration	to	the	time	limits	at	
EU	level.	
Simplified	treaty	amendment	procedures	and	special	treaty	amendment	
procedures	as	per	Article	48	para	6	subsection	2	and	3	TEU	and	Article	218	
para	8	subsection	2	s.	2	or	as	per	Article	311	para	3	TFEU:	approval	of	Federal	
Republic	of	German	by	law	as	per	Article	23	para	1	of	the	Basic	Law
Resolution	of	joint	defence	(Article	42	para	2	subsection	1	s.	2	TEU):	
representative	in	European	Council	only	allowed	to	approve	suggested	
resolution	or	abstain	after	the	Bundestag	has	passed	a	resolution	on	this	topic	
–	otherwise	rejection;	FRG	approval	by	law	as	per	Article	23	para	1	of	the	Basic	
Law	
Bridging	clauses	/	expansion	of	competences	clauses	/	amendment	of	statutes	/	
flexibility	clause	(Article	48	para	7	subsection	1	s.	1	or	subsection	2	TEU,	Article	
81	para	3	subsection	2	TFEU,	Article	83	para	1	subsection	3	or	Article	86	para	
4	TFEU,	Article	308	para	3	TFEU,	Article	352	TFEU):	representative	may	only	
approve	resolution	or	abstain	after	law	as	per	Article	23	para	1	of	the	Basic	Law	
is	in	force	–	otherwise	rejection
Right	of	rejection	for	bridging	clauses	(Article	48	para	7	subsection	3	TEU,	Article	
81	para	3	subsection	3	TFEU)	
Special	bridging	clauses	(Article	31	para	3	TEU,	Article	312	para	2	subsection	
2	TFEU,	Article	153	para	2	subsection	4,	Article	192	para	2	subsection	2	or	
Article	133	para	1	or	para.	2	TFEU):	representative	in	only	allowed	to	approve	
suggested	resolution	or	abstain	after	the	Bundestag	has	passed	a	resolution	on	
this	topic
Emergency	braking	mechanism	(Article	48	para	2	s.	1,	Article	82,	para	3	
subsection	1,	s.	1	and	Article	83	para	3	subsection	1	s.	1	TFEU):	representative	
must	apply	for	referral	to	European	Council	if	so	instructed	by	Bundestag	
resolution
Action	against	infringements	of	the	subsidiarity	principle:	Bundestag	obliged	
to	make	a	complaint	if	requested	to	do	so	by		¼	of	MPs	as	per	Article	8	PSV;	
¼	of	those	not	supporting	complaint	can	request	that	their	view	be	included	in	
complaint
Rights of information/Information
Basically	with	reference	to	above-mentioned	regulations
Law on the giving of guarantees 
to maintain the Hellenic Republic‘s 
ability to pay which is required for 
financial stability in the monetary 
union (Currency-Finance-Stability 
Law – WFStG)
07/05/2010	
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2010a)
Regulations	on	guarantees	for	Greece
Provision	of	information	to	Committee	on	Budgets
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Law	on	the	giving	
of	guarantees	
within	the	frame-
work	of	a	European	
stability	mechanism	
22/05/201
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2010b)
Right to state opinion and be informed
Federal	Government	will	endeavour	to	obtain	consensus	when	accepting	guarantees;	right	of	
Committee	on	Budgets	to	state	official	opinion	and	be	informed
Quarterly	information	on	guarantees	and	use
Regulations	on	exceeding	limit	of	guarantees
Amended	by	law	of	
09/10/2011
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2011)
Bundestag’s	responsibility	for	budget	and	stability
Parliamentary	reservation
Participation	of	Committee	on	Budgets
Regulations	regarding	provision	of	information
Amended	by	law	of	
23/05/2012
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2012a)
Regulations	on	special	committee
Law	on	Treaty	of	2	
February	2012	on	
the	establishment	
of	a	European	Sta-
bility	Mechanism	
13.09.2012
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2012b)
Federal	law	required	to	change	authorized	capital	German	representative	may	only	vote	in	
favour	of	changing	the	instruments	of	financial	aid	or	abstain	if	authorized	by	Bundestag
ESM	Financing	
Treaty	(ESMFinG)
13.09.2012		
German	Federal	Law	
Gazette	(2012c)
Bundestag’s	responsibility	for	budget	and	stability
Overall	responsibility	for	budgetary	policy	and	parliamentary	reservation
Overall	budgetary	responsibility	to	be	dealt	with	in	plenary	session	
Government	may	only	vote	in	favour	in	such	cases	after	resolution	in	plenary	session	–	otherwise	
rejection
Participation	of	Committee	on	Budgets
If	plenary	session	unnecessary	–	Committee	on	Budgets
Detailed	descriptions	of	projects	requiring	approval	of	Committee	on	Budgets
Right	to	state	official	opinion	
Rights	of	information
Regulations	on	special	committee
Duty	of	government	to	provide	information
Source: own	compilation,	supplemented	by	Ms	Barnickel	(2010:	113	–	115)
Further sources:
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2005):	Law	on	the	extension	and	strengthening	of	the	rights	of	the	Bundestag	and	the	Federal	Council	in	
affairs	of	the	European	Union	of	17/11/2005.	Bonn:	BGBl.	2005	I	no.	71,	3178-3180
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2006a):	Law	on	amendment	of	the	Basic	Law	of	28/08/2006.	Bonn:	BGBl.	2006	I	no.	41,	2034-2038
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2006b):	Agreement	between	German	Bundestag	and	the	Federal	Government	on	cooperation	in	Affairs	of	the	
European	Union	of	28/09/2006.	Bonn:	BGBl.	2006	I	no.	44,	2177-2180
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2008):	Law	on	amendment	of	the	Basic	Law	(Articles	23,	45	and	93)	of	8	October	2008	of	2008	I	no.	56,	p.	1926
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2009a):	Law	on	the	extension	and	strengthening	of	the	rights	of	the	Bundestag	and	the	Federal	Council	in	
affairs	of	the	European	Union	of	22/09/2009.	Bonn:	BGBl.	2009	I	no.	60,	3022-3025
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German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2009b):	Law	on	amendment	of	law	on	cooperation	between	the	German	Government	and	the	Bundestag	in	
affairs	of	the	European	Union	of	22/09/2009.	Bonn:	BGBl.	I	2009	no.	60,	3026-3030
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2009c):	Law	on	implementation	of	amendments	to	the	Basic	Law	for	the	ratification	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	of	
01/09/2009.	Bonn:	BGBl.	2009	I	no.	76,	3822-3823
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2010a):	Law	on	the	giving	of	guarantees	to	maintain	the	Hellenic	Republic‘s	ability	to	pay	which	is	required	
for	financial	stability	in	the	monetary	union	(Currency-Finance-Stability	Law	–	WFStG)	of	2010	I,	no.	19,	s.	537
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2010b):	Law	on	the	giving	of	guarantees	within	the	framework	of	a	European	stability	mechanism	of	2010	I	
no.	24	of	22/05/2010,	p.	627
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2011):	Law	on	amending	the	law	on	the	giving	of	guarantees	within	the	framework	of	a	European	stability	
mechanism	of	2011	I	no.	51	of	13/10/2011,	p.	1992
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2012d):	Law	on	treaty	of	2	February	2012	on	the	establishment	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	of	2012	
II	no.	28	of	18/09/2012,	p.	981
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2012a):	Second	law	on	amendment	of	law	on	stability	mechanism	of	2012	I	no.	23	of	31/05/2012,	p.	1166
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2012c):	Law	on	financial	participation	in	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM	Financing	Treaty	–	ESMFinG)	of	
2012	I	no.	43,	pp.	1918ff
German	Federal	Law	Gazette	(2012b):	Law	on	Treaty	of	2	March	2012	on	stability,	coordination	and	governance	in	Economic	and	Monetary	
Union	of	13/09/2012	of	2012	II	no.	28,	p.	1006
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Extracts from the most important cited treaties and laws 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU)
Art. 2 [Basic values]
1The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 2These values are 
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
Art. 5 [Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality)
[…] (3) Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
1The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 2National Parliaments ensure compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol […].
Art. 9 [Principle of equality; European citizenship]
1In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive 
equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. 2Every national of a Member State shall be 
a citizen of the Union. 3Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not 
replace it.
Art. 10 [Democratic principles]
(1) The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.
(2) Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.
Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or government and in the 
Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or 
to their citizens. […]
Art. 11 [Citizen participation]
(1) The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity 
to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action.
(2) The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associa-
tions and civil society.
(3) The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure 
that the Union‘s actions are coherent and transparent.
(4) Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take 
the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any 
appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties.
The procedures and conditions required for such a citizens‘ initiative shall be determined in accordance with 
the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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Article 12 [Participation of national parliaments]
National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union:
(a) through being informed by the institutions of the Union and having draft legislative acts of the Union 
forwarded to them in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union;
(b) by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in accordance with the procedures provided 
for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
(c) by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation 
mechanisms for the implementation of the Union policies in that area, in accordance with Article 70 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and through being involved in the political monitoring of 
Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust‘s activities in accordance with Articles 88 and 85 of that Treaty;
(d) by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties, in accordance with Article 48 of this Treaty;
(e) by being notified of applications for accession to the Union, in accordance with Article 49 of this Treaty;
Article 48 [Treaty changes]
[…] (6) The government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Commission may submit to 
the European Council proposals for revising all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union relating to the internal policies and action of the Union.
1The European Council may adopt a decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. 2The European Council shall act by unanimity after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Commission, and the European Central Bank in the case of institutional 
changes in the monetary area. 3That decision shall not enter into force until it is approved by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
The decision referred to in the second subparagraph shall not increase the competences conferred on the 
Union in the Treaties.
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Article 2 [Types of competencies]
(1) When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so 
empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.
(2) 1When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, 
the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. 2The Member 
States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. 3The 
Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease 
exercising its competence.
Article 20 [European citizenship]
(1) 1Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. 2Every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union. 3Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
citizenship. […]
Article 22 [Electoral law]
(1) 1Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the 
same conditions as nationals of that State. 2This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements 
adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after 
consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by 
problems specific to a Member State.
(2) 1Without prejudice to Article 223(1) and to the provisions adopted for its implementation, every citizen of 
the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand 
as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the 
same conditions as nationals of that State. 2This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements 
adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after 
consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by 
problems specific to a Member State.
Article 26 [Realisation of the internal market]
[…] (2) The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties […].
Article 28 [Customs union]
(1) The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods and which shall involve the 
prohibition between Member States of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having 
equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries.
(2) The provisions of Article 30 and of Chapter 2 of this Title shall apply to products originating in Member 
States and to products coming from third countries which are in free circulation in Member States.
Article 34 [Banning of import restrictions]
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States.
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Article 45 [Free movement of workers]
(1) Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. […]
Article 49 [Freedom of establishment]
1Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. 2Such prohibition 
shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any 
Member State established in the territory of any Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons 
and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country 
where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
Article 56 [Freedom of services]
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the 
Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State 
other than that of the person for whom the services are intended. […]
Article 63 [Free movement of capital and payments]
(1) Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. […]
Article 121 [Coordination of economic policy]
(1) Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate 
them within the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 120.
(2) The Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, formulate a draft for the broad guidelines 
of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, and shall report its findings to the European 
Council. The European Council shall, acting on the basis of the report from the Council, discuss a conclusion 
on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union.
1On the basis of this conclusion, the Council shall adopt a recommendation setting out these broad guide-
lines. 2The Council shall inform the European Parliament of its recommendation.
(3) In order to ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic 
performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on the basis of reports submitted by the Commission, 
monitor economic developments in each of the Member States and in the Union as well as the consistency of 
economic policies with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2, and regularly carry out an overall 
assessment.
For the purpose of this multilateral surveillance, Member States shall forward information to the Commission 
about important measures taken by them in the field of their economic policy and such other information as 
they deem necessary.
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(4) 1Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in paragraph 3, that the economic policies of a 
Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2 or that they risk 
jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a 
warning to the Member State concerned. 2The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may 
address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned. 3The Council may, on a proposal 
from the Commission, decide to make its recommendations public.
Within the scope of this paragraph, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member 
of the Council representing the Member State concerned.
A qualified majority of the other members of the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a).
(5) 1The President of the Council and the Commission shall report to the European Parliament on the results 
of multilateral surveillance. 2The President of the Council may be invited to appear before the competent 
committee of the European Parliament if the Council has made its recommendations public.
(6) The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure referred to in 
paragraphs 3 and 4.
Article 288 [Community legislation; Catalogue]
[…] (3) A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. […]
Article 352 [Clause on additional competencies]
(1) 1If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. 2Where the measures in 
question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parlia-
ment.
(2) Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Commission shall draw national Parliaments’ attention to proposals based on this 
Article.
(3) Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in 
cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.
(4) This Article cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security 
policy and any acts adopted pursuant to this Article shall respect the limits set out in Article 40, second 
paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union.
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Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
Article 20 [Constitutional Principles – Right of Resistance]
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. 
(2) 1All state authority is derived from the people. 2It shall be exercised by the people through elections and 
other votes and through speciﬁc legislative, executive and judicial bodies. […]
Article 23 [Realisation of the European Union – Participation of the Bundesrat and of the government]
(1) 1With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the 
development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the 
rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights 
essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. 2To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign 
powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. 3The establishment of the European Union, as well as 
changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or 
make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.
(1a) 1The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall have the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union to challenge a legislative act of the European Union for infringing the principle of 
subsidiarity. 2The Bundestag is obliged to initiate such an action at the request of one fourth of its Members. 
3By a statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat, exceptions from the ﬁrst sentence of paragraph (2) of 
Article 42, and the ﬁrst sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 52, may be authorised for the exercise of the 
rights granted to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat under the contractual foundations of the European 
Union.
(2) 1The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Länder shall participate in matters concerning the 
European Union. The Federal Government shall keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, compre-
hensively and at the earliest possible time.
(3) 1Before participating in legislative acts of the European Union, the Federal Government shall provide the 
Bundestag with an opportunity to state its position. The Federal Government shall take the position of the 
Bundestag into account during the negotiations. Details shall be regulated by a law.
(4) The Bundesrat shall participate in the decision-making process of the Federation insofar as it would have 
been competent to do so in a comparable domestic matter, or insofar as the subject falls within the domestic 
competence of the Länder.
(5) 1Insofar as, in an area within the exclusive competence of the Federation, interests of the Länder are 
affected, and in other matters, insofar as the Federation has legislative power, the Federal Government shall 
take the position of the Bundesrat into account. 
2To the extent that the legislative powers of the Länder, the structure of Land authorities, or Land adminis-
trative procedures are primarily affected, the position of the Bundesrat shall be given the greatest possible 
respect in determining the Federation’s position consistent with the responsibility of the Federation for the 
nation as a whole. 3In matters that may result in increased expenditures or reduced revenues for the 
Federation, the consent of the Federal Government shall be required.
(6) 1When legislative powers exclusive to the Länder concerning matters of school education, culture or 
broadcasting are primarily affected, the exercise of the rights belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany 
as a member state of the European Union shall be delegated by the Federation to a representative of the 
Länder designated by the Bundesrat. 2These rights shall be exercised with the participation of, and in 
coordination with, the Federal Government; their exercise shall be consistent with the responsibility of the 
Federation for the nation as a whole.
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(7) Details regarding paragraphs (4) to (6) of this Article shall be regulated by a law requiring the consent of 
the Bundesrat.
Article 38 [Elections]
(1) 1Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. 
2They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only 
to their conscience. […]
Article 45 [Committee on the European Union]
1The Bundestag shall appoint a Committee on the Affairs of the European Union. It may authorise the 
committee to exercise the rights of the Bundestag under Article 23 vis-à-vis the Federal Government. 2It may 
also empower it to exercise the rights granted to the Bundestag under the contractual foundations of the 
European Union.
Article 59 [Representation of the Federation for the Purposes of International Law] 
[…] (2) 1Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal 
legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies responsible in 
such a case for the enactment of federal law. 2In the case of executive agreements the provisions concerning 
the federal administration shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 79 [Amendment of the Constitution]
[…] (2) Any such law shall be carried by two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag and two thirds of the 
votes of the Bundesrat.
 (3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on 
principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.
Article 115 [Generation of credit]
(1) The borrowing of funds and the assumption of surety obligations, guarantees, or other commitments that 
may lead to expenditures in future ﬁ scal years shall require authorisation by a federal law specifying or 
permitting computation of the amounts involved.
(2) 1Revenues and expenditures shall in principle be balanced without revenue from credits. 2This principle 
shall be satisﬁed when revenue obtained by the borrowing of funds does not exceed 0.35 percent in relation 
to the nominal gross domestic product. 3In addition, when economic developments deviate from normal 
conditions, effects on the budget in periods of upswing and downswing must be taken into account 
symmetrically. 4Deviations of actual borrowing from the credit limits speciﬁed under the ﬁrst to third 
sentences are to be recorded on a control account; debits exceeding the threshold of 1.5 percent in relation 
to the nominal gross domestic product are to be reduced in accordance with the economic cycle. 5The 
regulation of details, especially the adjustment of revenue and expenditures with regard to ﬁnancial 
transactions and the procedure for the calculation of the yearly limit on net borrowing, taking into account 
the economic cycle on the basis of a procedure for adjusting the cycle together with the control and balanc-
ing of deviations of actual borrowing from the credit limit, requires a federal law. 6In cases of natural 
catastrophes or unusual emergency situations beyond governmental control and substantially harmful to the 
state’s ﬁnancial capacity, these credit limits may be exceeded on the basis of a decision by a majority of the 
Bundestag’s Members. 7The decision has to be combined with an amortisation plan. 8Repayment of the 
credits borrowed under the sixth sentence must be accomplished within an appropriate period of time.
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Law on the Co-operation between the Bund and Länder in Matters of the European Union 
Section 5 [Consideration of the opinion of the Bundesrat] 
[…] (2) 1If a proposal primarily concerns the legislative powers of the Länder and the Bund has no right of 
legislation or a proposal primarily concerns the structure of Land authorities or their administrative proce-
dures, then the Bundesrat’s views must be given due consideration in determining the negotiating position; 
in other respects, Paragraph 1 applies. 2The general governmental responsibility of the Bund, including 
questions that are to be considered in terms of foreign, defence and integration policy, is to be preserved. 
3Should the opinion of the Bundesregierung not be in accordance with the position of the Bundesrat, an 
agreement is to be sought. 4To bring about this agreement, the Bundesregierung, with representatives of the 
Länder, is to be consulted again. 5Should an agreement not eventuate and the Bundesrat afterwards confirm 
its opinion with a decision reached with two thirds of its votes, then the opinion of the Bundesrat is authori-
tative. 6The agreement of the Bundesregierung is required when decisions lead to expenditure increases or 
revenue decreases for the Bund. […]
Law on the Co-operation between the Bundesregierung and Bundesrat 
in Matters of the European Union
Section 9 [Opinions of the Bundesrat]
[…] (4) 1Should the Bundestag make use of the opportunity to present its comments, in accordance with Article 
23 Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the Basic Law, then the Bundesregierung shall enter a parliamentary reservation 
in the Council if the decision of the Bundestag is in one of its fundamental respects not enforceable.
2The Bundesregierung shall immediately inform the Bundestag about this in a separate report. 3This report 
must be suitable in form and content to make an advisory session in the committees of the Bundestag 
possible. 4Before the final decision in the Council, the Bundesregierung shall endeavour to reach an agree-
ment with the Bundestag. 5This also applies when the Bundestag adopts a position on a proposal of the 
European Union in questions of local service provisions. 6The right of the Bundesregierung, when aware of 
the position of the Bundestag, to make divergent decisions, remains unaffected. [...]
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Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters 
Concerning the European Union (Responsibility for Integration Act)
Section 4 [Bridging Clauses]
(1) 1The German representative in the European Council may approve a proposal for a decision within the 
meaning of Article 48(7), first subparagraph, first sentence, or second subparagraph, of the Treaty on 
European Union or abstain from voting on such a proposal only after a law to that effect as defined in 
Article 23(1) of the Basic Law has entered into force. 2In the absence of such a law, the German representa-
tive in the European Council must reject the proposal for a decision.
(2) 1The German representative in the Council may approve a proposal for a decision within the meaning of 
Article 81(3), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or abstain from 
voting on such a proposal only after a law to that effect as defined in Article 23(1) of the Basic Law has 
entered into force. 2In the absence of such a law, the German representative in the European Council must 
reject the proposal for a decision […].
Section 5 [Approval in the European Council in the case of special bridging clauses]
(1) 1The German representative in the European Council may approve a proposal for a decision within the 
meaning of Article 31(3) of the Treaty on European Union or Article 312(2), second subparagraph, of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or abstain from voting on such a proposal only after 
the Bundestag has taken a decision to that effect. 2The Federal Government may also table a motion in the 
Bundestag to that end. 3In the absence of such a decision by the Bundestag, the German representative in 
the European Council must reject the proposal for a decision.
(2) In addition to the decision of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat must also have taken a corresponding 
decision if areas of activity are affected
1. for which no federal legislative competence exists,
2. in which the Länder are empowered to legislate by virtue of Article 72(2) of the Basic Law,
3. in which the Länder may adopt divergent provisions under Article 72(3) or Article 84(1) of the Basic Law, or
4. the regulation of which by means of a federal law requires the consent of the Bundesrat.
Section 6 [Approval in the European Council in the case of special bridging clauses]
(1) 1The German representative in the Council may approve a proposal for a decision within the meaning of 
Article 153(2), fourth subparagraph, Article 192(2), second subparagraph, or Article 331(1) or (2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or abstain from voting on such a proposal only after 
the Bundestag has taken a decision to that effect. The second and third sentences of section 5(1) of this Act 
shall apply, mutatis mutandis.
(2) Section 5(2) of this Act shall apply, mutatis mutandis.
Section 8 [Flexibility clause]
1The German representative in the Council may approve a decision on the adoption of measures within the 
meaning of Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or abstain from voting on 
such a decision only after a law to that effect as defined in Article 23(1) of the Basic Law has entered into 
force. 2In the absence of such a law, the German representative in the Council must reject the proposal for a 
decision.
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Act on Financial Participation in the European Stability Mechanism 
Section 4 [Parliamentary reservation for decisions in the European Stability Mechanism] 
(1) 1The plenary of the German Bundestag will take responsibility for matters of the European Stability 
Mechanism that concern the budgetary comprehensive responsibility of the German Bundestag. 2The 
budgetary comprehensive responsibility is especially concerned. 
1. in decisions according to Article 13 Paragraph 2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mecha-
nism, to grant stability aid, in the form of a financial grant facility provided for in the Treaty Establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism, to a signatory party to the European Stability Mechanism in response to their 
requests for assistance,
2. in the approval of an agreement concerning the financial grant facility in accordance with Article 13 
Paragraph 3 Sentence 3 of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism and an agreement to a 
corresponding Memorandum of Understanding in accordance with Article 13 Paragraph 4 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 
3. in decisions within the scope of the European Stability Mechanism that change the approved share capital 
as well as the maximum loan volumes in accordance with Article 10 Paragraph 1 of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism; Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Law to the Treaty of February 2, 2012 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism remains unaffected. [...]
Section 7 [Information provided by the Bundesregierung] 
(1) 1The Bundesregierung must comprehensively, at the earliest possible point in time, continually and as a 
rule in writing, inform the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in matters of this law. 2The Bundesregierung must 
give the Bundestag, in matters that concern its competencies, opportunity to take a position; the Bundesr-
egierung must also consider the opinions of the Bundestag. […]
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